Union of India v. Padam Narain Aggarwal , (SC) BS147250
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Before:- C.K. Thakker and D.K. Jain, JJ.

Criminal Appeal No. 1575 of 2008 [Arising Out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2075 of 2007]. D/d. 3.10.2008.

Union of India - Appellant

Versus

Padam Narain Aggarwal Etc. - Respondents

IMPORTANT

Blanket order of bail - A person summoned by Custom Officer - High Court directed that person should not be arrested for 10 days if Custom Officer found that some non-bailable offence was committed by him - Order illegal and set aside - It is blanket order of bail and granted protection in respect of any non-bailable offence.

A. Custom Act, 1962, Section 108 - Criminal Procedure Code, Section 438 - Blanket anticipatory bail - Custom Officer summoning a person under Section 108 of Customs Act in connection with an enquiry - The person applying for anticipatory bail - High Court rejected the bail application holding that it was premature - High Court, however, directed that if the Custom Authorities find any non-bailable offence against the person, he shall not be arrested without ten days prior notice - Order of High Court set aside - Held:-

(1) Order passed by High Court was a blanket order and seeks to grant protection to the person in respect of any non-bailable offence.

(2) The order illegally obstructs, interferes and curtails the authority of Custom Officers from exercising statutory power of arrest a person said to have committed a non-bailable offence by imposing a condition of giving ten days prior notice, a condition not warranted by law. 1980(2) SCC 565 and 2005(7) SCC 56 relied.

[Para 63]

B. Custom Act, 1962, Section 108 - Evidentiary value of statements of persons recorded by Custom Officers under Section 108 Custom Act - Sections 107 and 109 of Customs Act confer power on Custom Officers to examine persons, to summon them to give evidence and to produce documents - A person called upon to make a statement before the Custom Authorities cannot be said to be an accused of an offence - It is, therefore, clear that if a person is called upon to make a statement under Section 108 of the Act and summon is issued for the said purpose, he is bound to comply with such direction - Section 108 does not contemplate magisterial intervention - The power is exercised by a Gazetted Officer of the Department - It obliges the person summoned to state truth upon any subject respecting which he is examined. He is not absolved from speaking truth on the ground that such statement is admissible in evidence and could be used against him - The provision thus enables the officer to elicit truth from the person examined - The underlying object of Section 108 is to ensure that the officer questioning the person gets all the truth concerning the incident. 1969(2) SCR 461 and 2000(3) RCR (Criminal) 719 (SC) relied.

[Paras 55 to 59]

C. Custom Act, 1962, Section 108 - Sections 10709 confer power on Custom Officers to examine persons, to summon them to give evidence and to produce documents - A person called upon to make a statement before the Custom Authorities cannot be said to be an accused of an offence - It is, therefore, clear that if a person is called upon to make a statement under Section 108 of the Act and summon is issued for the said purpose, he is bound to comply with such direction - The person examined by Custom Officer has to speak truth - He is not excused from speaking the truth on the premise that such statement could be used against him - Further held :-

Statements recorded under Section 108 of the Act are distinct and different from statements recorded by Police Officers during the course of investigation under the Code. 1969(2) SCR 461 and 2000(3) RCR (Criminal) 719 (SC) relied.

[Paras 54, 58 and 59]

D. Criminal Procedure Code, Section 438 - Anticipatory bail - Before grant of anticipatory bail - The Court must be satisfied that the applicant invoking the provision of anticipatory bail has 'reason to believe' that he is likely to be arrested for a non-cognizable offence - Further held :-

(1) High Court or the Court of Session must apply its own mind to the question and decide whether a case has been made out for grant of such relief.

(2) If there is no reason to believe that the applicant is likely to be arrested for commission of a non-bailable offence, the Court has no power to grant anticipatory bail.

(3) A 'blanket order' of anticipatory bail should not generally be passed i.e. that the applicant shall be released on bail whenever arrested for whichever offence whatsoever. 1980(2) SCC 565 and 2005(2) RCR (Criminal) 32 : 2005(1) Apex Criminal 473 (SC) relied.

[Para 41, 42, 43, 45, 48 and 49]

E. Custom Act, 1962, Sections 104 and 108 - Arrest of a person by Custom Officer - Power to arrest a person by a Custom Officer is statutory in character and cannot be interfered with - Such power of arrest can be exercised only in those cases where the Custom Officer has 'reason to believe' that a person has been guilty of an offence punishable under Sections 132, 133, 135, 135A or 136 of the Act - The power to arrest thus is circumscribed by objective considerations and cannot be exercised on whims, caprice or fancy of the officer - Custom Officer has to inform the person arrested of the grounds of arrest as soon as may be - The law requires such person to be produced before a Magistrate 'without unnecessary delay'.

[Paras 51 and 52]

F. Criminal Procedure, sections 438 and 439 Criminal Procedure Code, SectionsBTZKACA226ETZK41 to 44 and 46 - Meaning of term "arrest" - The arrest has neither been defined in Criminal Procedure Code or Indian Penal Code nor in any other enactment dealing with offences. The word "arrest" is derived from the French word "arrater" meaning "to stop or stay" - It signifies a restraint of a person - "Arrest" is thus a restraint of a man's person, obliging him to be obedient to law - "Arrest" then may be defined as "the execution of the command of a Court of Law or of a duly authorised officer".

[Para 22]

G. Customs Act, 1962 Section 104 Arrest of a person by Custom Officer - Section 104 empowers a Custom Officer to arrest a person if he has 'reason to believe' that such person has committed any offence mentioned in Customs Act - It also enjoins the officer to take the arrested person to a Magistrate 'without unnecessary delay' - The section also provides for release of such person on bail.

[Para 25]

H. Criminal Procedure Code, Section 438 - Anticipatory bail - Meaning of - The expression anticipatory bail has not been defined in Criminal Procedure Code - Anticipatory bail means a bail in anticipation of arrest - The expression 'anticipatory bail' is a misnomer inasmuch as it is not as if bail presently granted in anticipation of arrest - Where a competent court grants 'anticipatory bail', it makes an order that in the event of arrest, a person shall be released on bail - There is no question of release on bail unless a person is arrested and, therefore, it is only on arrest that the order granting anticipatory bail becomes operative.

[Para 26]

I. Criminal Procedure Code, Section 438 - Anticipatory Bail - Granting 'anticipatory bail' is extraordinary in character and only in exceptional cases where it appears that a person is falsely implicated or a frivolous case is launched against him or "there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to abscond, or otherwise misuse his liberty while on bail" that such power may be exercised.

[Para 28]

J. Discretionary Power of conferred - Exercise of - Discretionary power conferred by the Legislature on higher judiciary cannot be put in a straight-jacket formula. Such power must be exercised by the Court keeping in view facts and circumstances of an individual case.

[Para 37]

Cases Referred :-

Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565.

Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, AIR 1978 Punjab and Haryana 1 : 1978 Crl LJ 20 (FB).

Adri Dharan Das v. State of West Bengal, 2005(2) RCR (Criminal) 32 : 2005(1) Apex Criminal 473 : (2005)4 SCC 303.

Balchand Jain v. State of M.P., (1976)4 SCC 572.

Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, (1969)2 SCR 461.

Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Rajamundry v. Duncan Agro Industries Ltd., 2000(3) RCR (Criminal) 719 : (2000)7 SCC 53.

JUDGMENT

C.K. Thakker, J. - Leave granted.

2. The present appeal is filed by the Union of India against the judgment and order dated November 30, 2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan (Jaipur Bench) in S.B. Criminal Misc. Bail Application Nos. 7572 and 7573 of 2006 whereby certain directions have been issued by a Single Judge to the Customs Authorities. The High Court held that since the respondents herein were merely summoned under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 to give their statements in the inquiry, anticipatory bail applications filed by them were pre-mature and were required to be disposed of. The learned Single Judge, therefore, ordered the respondents to appear before the Customs Authorities in response to the summons. He, however, directed that in case the Customs Authorities find that any non-bailable offence has been committed by the respondents, they shall not be arrested without ten days prior notice.

Facts

3. It is the case of the appellant (Union of India) that Director of Revenue Intelligence ('DRI' for short) was investigating the matter in respect of export of readymade garments by M/s B.A. International valued at Rs. 4.75 crores through various ports during December, 2000 to March, 2003. According to the allegation of the appellant, on the basis of information received from the Income Tax Department on September 15, 2006, investigation was conducted and search operation was carried out at two office premises of M/s B.A. International which revealed that the so-called suppliers of raw material i.e. fabrics and job workers of garments, were bogus and non-existent entities and at the declared address, no such firms or business entities were found. The accused thereby fraudulently availed drawback amounting to Rs. 75 lakhs approximately.

4. M/s B.A. International is a partnership firm and is controlled by Padam Narain Agarwal-respondent No. 1. Asha Rani Aggarwal, respondent No. 2 is the wife of Padam Narain Aggarwal. Other partners of the said firm are family members of Padam Narain Aggarwal. The overseas inquiry conducted through Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) and Director of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) disclosed export of readymade garments under two shipping bills and receipt of foreign exchange. But in fact, no such export had been made either by Padam Narain Aggarwal or by M/s B.A. International.

5. Investigation also revealed that false and fabricated bills were prepared in order to mislead Investigating Agencies. Income Tax Department, hence, disallowed the benefit of exports said to have been earned by M/s B.A. International against the shipping bills as claimed by the partnership firm under Section 80 HHC of the Income Tax Act, 1961 by treating the remittance as bogus export proceeds. Departmental proceedings

6. Proceedings were initiated by the Customs Department under the Customs Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act). The respondents were issued summons to appear on September 15, 16, 22, 25, 29 and on October 6, 11, 17 and 26, 2006, so as to enable the Department to investigate the case. The respondents, however, did not join the investigation and there was total non-co-operation by them.

Criminal proceedings

7. In view of non-co-operation by the respondents, complaints were filed by the Custom Authorities in a competent Court on September 16, 2006 and November 17, 2006 for commission of offences punishable under Sections 174 and 175, Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Application for anticipatory bail

8. The accused came to know about the filing of complaints. They, therefore, made applications for anticipatory bail before the District and Sessions Court, Jaipur. The learned Judge, however, dismissed the applications by an order dated November 22, 2006. The accused approached the High Court of Rajasthan (Jaipur Bench) and as stated above, the applications were disposed of by the High Court directing the Customs Authorities not to arrest the respondents of any non-bailable offence without ten days prior notice to them.

9. The High Court stated :

10. The said order is challenged by the Union of India in this Court.

Earlier orders

11. On April 23, 2007, the matter was placed for admission hearing. Notice was issued by this Court and respondents were granted time to file affidavit in reply. Affidavits were, thereafter, filed. Considering the nature of directions issued by the High Court, the Registry was asked to place the matter for final hearing and that is how the matter has been placed before us.

Submissions of counsel

12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

13. The learned Addl. Solicitor General, appearing for Union of India contended that the order passed by the High Court is illegal and erroneous. The counsel submitted that once the High Court held that the respondents were merely summoned under Section 108 of the Act to give statements in the inquiry and anticipatory bail applications were premature, no further direction could have been issued. The High Court rightly directed the respondents to appear before the Customs Authorities on December 4, 2006 at 11.00 a.m. To that extent the Union is not aggrieved.

14. The learned counsel, however, vehemently contended that the direction to the Customs Authorities not to arrest the respondents even if they had committed any non-bailable offence without ten days prior notice to them is totally illegal and unlawful. No such order could have been passed by the Court. It was submitted that on two counts the order is illegal; (i) it is a blanket order of anticipatory bail in respect of 'any non-bailable offence'; and (ii) a direction to issue ten days prior notice before arrest is unknown to law. It was, therefore, submitted that the order deserves to be set aside by allowing the Customs Authorities to take appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.

15. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, supported the order passed by the High Court. It was submitted that the High Court felt that since only summons was issued to the respondents for recording statements in inquiry, anticipatory bail applications were premature and High Court rightly disposed them of on that ground. A direction was also issued to the respondents herein to appear before the Customs Authorities on a particular day. However, with a view to protect interest of the respondents, the High Court directed the authorities not to arrest them before issuing prior notice of ten days. In exercise of discretionary power, the High Court issued the above direction which may not be interfered with in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.

High Court's directions not in accordance with law

16. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having given anxious consideration to the controversy raised and the proceedings initiated against the respondents, we are of the view that no such order could have been passed nor a direction as to prior notice before effecting arrest could have been issued by the High Court.

Statutory provisions

17. To understand the issues raised by the Union of India in the appeal, let us examine the relevant provisions of the Customs Act, 1962.

18. The Act consolidates and amends the law relating to customs. Chapter IV empowers the Central Government to prohibit import or export of goods of specified description. Chapters IVA to IVC relate to detection of illegally imported goods, prevention of disposal thereof, etc.

19. Chapter XIII (Sections 100-110) is an important Chapter and deals with search, seizure and arrest. Sections 10003 authorise Custom Officers to search suspected persons.

Section 104 enables Custom Officers to arrest a person. Similarly, power to search premises and conveyances is found in Sections 105 to 106A. Sections 10709 empower Custom Officers to examine persons and summon them to give evidence and produce documents. Seizure of goods, documents and things can be effected under Section 110.

20. Chapter XIV provides for confiscation of goods and conveyances as also imposition of penalties. Chapter XVI (Sections 132-140A) deals with offences and prosecutions.

Power to arrest

21. Having noticed the relevant provisions of the Act, let us now consider ambit and scope of power of arrest.

22. The term "arrest" has neither been defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 nor in the Indian Penal Code, 1860 nor in any other enactment dealing with offences. The word "arrest" is derived from the French word "arrater" meaning "to stop or stay". It signifies a restraint of a person. "Arrest" is thus a restraint of a man's person, obliging him to be obedient to law. "Arrest" then may be defined as "the execution of the command of a Court of Law or of a duly authorised officer".

23. Sections 4144 and 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deal with arrest of a person. Section 41 empowers a Police Officer to arrest any person without warrant. Section 42 deals with the power of a Police Officer to arrest any person who in the presence of such Police Officer has committed or has been accused of committing a non-cognizable offence and refuses to give his name and residence or gives a name or residence which such officer has reason to believe to be false. Section 43 enables a private person to arrest any person who in his presence commits a non-cognizable offence, or is a proclaimed offender. Section 44 deals with cases of arrest by a Magistrate. Section 46 lays down manner of arrest.

24. So far as the Customs Act, 1962 is concerned, the power to arrest is contained in Section 104 thereof. It reads thus :

25. Section 104 thus empowers a Custom Officer to arrest a person if he has 'reason to believe' that such person has committed any offence mentioned therein. It also enjoins the officer to take the arrested person to a Magistrate 'without unnecessary delay'. The section also provides for release of such person on bail.

Anticipatory bail

26. Section 438 of the Code makes special provision for granting 'anticipatory bail' which was introduced in the present Code of 1973. The expression ('anticipatory bail') has not been defined in the Code. But as observed in Balchand Jain v. State of M.P., (1976)4 SCC 572, anticipatory bail means a bail in anticipation of arrest. The expression 'anticipatory bail' is a misnomer inasmuch as it is not as if bail presently granted in anticipation of arrest. Where a competent court grants 'anticipatory bail', it makes an order that in the event of arrest, a person shall be released on bail. There is no question of release on bail unless a person is arrested and, therefore, it is only on arrest that the order granting anticipatory bail becomes operative.

27. It was also observed that the power of granting 'anticipatory bail' is extraordinary in character and only in exceptional cases where it appears that a person is falsely implicated or a frivolous case is launched against him or "there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to abscond, or otherwise misuse his liberty while on bail" that such power may be exercised. Thus, the power is 'unusual in nature' and is entrusted only to the higher echelons of judicial service, i.e. a Court of Session and a High Court.

28. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (old Code) did not contain specific provision corresponding to Section 438 of the present Code of 1973. Under the old Code, there was a sharp difference of opinion amongst various High Courts on the question whether a Court had inherent power to make an order of bail in anticipation of arrest. The preponderance of view, however, was that it did not have such power. The Law Commission of India considered and question and recommended to introduce express provision by observing as under :

[Law Commission of India, Forty-first Report, Vol. 1, p.32, para 39.9.]

29. The suggestion of the Law Commission was accepted by the Central Government and in the Draft Bill of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1970, Clause 447 conferred an express power on the High Court and the Court of Session to grant anticipatory bail.

30. The Law Commission again considered the issue and stated :

[Law Commission of India, Forty-eighth Report, para 31]

31. Keeping in view the reports of the Law Commission, Section 438 was inserted in the present Code. Sub-section (1) of Section 438 enacts that when any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or to the Court of Session for a direction that in the event of his arrest he shall be released on bail, and the Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that in the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail.

32. Sub-section (2) empowers the High Court or the Court of Session to impose conditions enumerated therein.

33. Sub-section (3) states that if such person is thereafter arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station on such accusation, he shall be released on bail.

34. In the leading case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia & Ors. v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565., the Constitution Bench of this Court was called upon to consider correctness or otherwise of principles laid down by the Full Bench of High Court of Punjab & Haryana in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, AIR 1978 Punjab and Haryana 1 : 1978 Crl LJ 20 (FB). The Full Bench of the High Court summarised the law relating to anticipatory bail as reflected in Section 438 of the Code and laid down certain principles as to when discretionary power to grant anticipatory bail may be exercised by a Court.

35. This Court partly disagreeing with the judgment of the High Court held that the Legislature conferred a wide discretion on the High Court and the Court of Session to grant anticipatory bail since it felt, firstly, that it would be difficult to enumerate the conditions under which anticipatory bail should or should not be granted and secondly, because the intention was to allow the higher courts in the echelon a somewhat free hand in the grant of relief in the nature of anticipatory bail.

36. The Court stated :

37. According to this Court, therefore, discretionary power conferred by the Legislature on higher judiciary cannot be put in a straight-jacket formula. Such power must be exercised by the Court keeping in view facts and circumstances of an individual case.

38. Speaking for the Court, Chandrachud, C.J. stated :

39. We may also refer to at this stage 'Malimath Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice System'. Considering the exercise of power by Courts under Section 438 and grant of anticipatory bail in favour of applicants, the Committee observed that the provision as to anticipatory bail has often been 'misused by rich and influential people'. The Committee, however, opined to retain the provision subject to two conditions;

40. It may be stated that Section 438 has been amended by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005 which now provides for hearing of Public Prosecutor before granting an application for anticipatory bail. Sub-sections (1A) and (1B) also provide for notice and presence of applicant in the Court seeking anticipatory bail. The said provisions, however, have not been brought into force so far.

41. In Gurbaksh Singh, this Court also held that before power under sub-section (1) of Section 438 is exercised, the Court must be satisfied that the applicant invoking the provision of anticipatory bail has 'reason to believe' that he is likely to be arrested for a non-cognizable offence.

42. The Court stated :

43. The Court proceeded to state that the High Court or the Court of Session must apply its own mind to the question and decide whether a case has been made out for grant of such relief. If condition precedent laid down in sub-section (1) of Section 438 is not satisfied and there is no reason to believe that the applicant is likely to be arrested for commission of a non-bailable offence, the Court has no power to grant anticipatory bail.

44. This Court, however, held that the High Court was wholly right so far as proposition (2) was concerned. The High Court in proposition (2) said :

45. Agreeing with the said proposition, this Court stated :

(emphasis supplied)

46. The Court also stated that apart from the language of the statute, there is an important principle involved in the insistence of the fact that the direction under Section 438(1) must be clear and specific and not vague and general.

47. The Court stated :

48. Gurbaksh Singh, thus clearly laid down that no blanket order of bail can be passed by a Court while exercising power under Section 438 of the Code.

49. In Adri Dharan Das v. State of West Bengal, 2005(2) RCR (Criminal) 32 : 2005(1) Apex Criminal 473 : (2005)4 SCC 303., referring to Gurbaksh Singh, this Court observed that normally, no direction should be issued to the effect that the applicant should be released on bail "whenever arrested for whichever offence whatsoever". Such order should not be passed as it would serve as a blanket to cover or protect any and every kind allegedly unlawful activity. An order under Section 438 is a device to secure the individual's liberty, it is neither a passport to the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of accusations likely or unlikely.

50. The Court proceeded to state :

(emphasis supplied)

Safeguards against abuse of power

51. From the above discussion, it is amply clear that power to arrest a person by a Custom Officer is statutory in character and cannot be interfered with. Such power of arrest can be exercised only in those cases where the Custom Officer has 'reason to believe' that a person has been guilty of an offence punishable under Sections 132, 133, 135, 135A or 136 of the Act. Thus, the power must be exercised on objective facts of commission of an offence enumerated and the custom officer has reason to believe that a person sought to be arrested has been guilty of commission of such offence. The power to arrest thus is circumscribed by objective considerations and cannot be exercised on whims, caprice or fancy of the officer.

52. The section also obliges the Custom Officer to inform the person arrested of the grounds of arrest as soon as may be. The law requires such person to be produced before a Magistrate 'without unnecessary delay'.

53. The law thus, on the one hand, allows a Custom Officer to exercise power to arrest a person who has committed certain offences, and on the other hand, takes due care to ensure individual freedom and liberty by laying down norms and providing safeguards so that the power of arrest is not abused or misused by the authorities. It is keeping in view these considerations that we have to decide correctness or otherwise of the directions issued by a single Judge of the High Court. 'Blanket' order of bail may amount to or result in an invitation to commit an offence or a passport to carry on criminal activities or to afford a shield against any and all types of illegal operations, which, in our judgment, can never be allowed in a society governed by Rule of Law.

Statements under Section 108, Customs Act : Evidentiary value

54. As already noted in the earlier part of the judgment, Sections 10709 confer power on Custom Officers to examine persons, to summon them to give evidence and to produce documents.

55. Section 108 which is a material provision, reads thus :

56. This section does not contemplate magisterial intervention. The power is exercised by a Gazetted Officer of the Department. It obliges the person summoned to state truth upon any subject respecting which he is examined. He is not absolved from speaking truth on the ground that such statement is admissible in evidence and could be used against him. The provision thus enables the officer to elicit truth from the person examined. The underlying object of Section 108 is to ensure that the officer questioning the person gets all the truth concerning the incident.

57. As held by Constitution Bench of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, (1969)2 SCR 461, a person called upon to make a statement before the Custom Authorities cannot be said to be an accused of an offence. It is, therefore, clear that if a person is called upon to make a statement under Section 108 of the Act and summon is issued for the said purpose, he is bound to comply with such direction. This view has been reiterated in several cases thereafter.

58. In Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Rajamundry v. Duncan Agro Industries Ltd., 2000(3) RCR (Criminal) 719 : (2000)7 SCC 53, this Court stated :

59. It is thus clear that statements recorded under Section 108 of the Act are distinct and different from statements recorded by Police Officers during the course of investigation under the Code.

Imposition of condition before effecting arrest

60. The counsel for the Union of India submitted that in spite of settled law on the point, the directions issued by the High Court have made the statutory provisions ineffective, nugatory and meaningless. Even if on the basis of statements of the respondents, the Custom Authorities are satisfied that the respondents had committed non-bailable offence and in exercise of statutory power, they could be arrested, the directions of the High Court will come in the way of the Authorities and will prevent them from exercising the power of arrest without complying the conditions imposed by the Court. No such condition on the exercise of statutory power could have been imposed by the High Court and since they are not in consonance with law, they are liable to be set aside.

61. The counsel, in this connection, invited our attention to a decision of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Rashid & Anr., (2005) 7 SCC 56. In that case, the High Court had issued a direction to the effect that if any crime is registered against M in future with a particular Police Station within three years, he shall not be arrested in connection therewith, except after service of four working days' advance notice in writing to him.

62. Describing the order as 'blanket', this Court held that, no such direction could have been issued by the High Court. The order was, therefore, set aside. The Court, however, observed that if a false case is registered against M, he can challenge it in an appropriate forum.

Conditions not lawful

63. In the case on hand, the respondents were only summoned under Section 108 of the Act for recording of their statements. The High Court was conscious and mindful of that fact. It, therefore, held that applications for anticipatory bail, in the circumstances, were pre-mature. They were, accordingly, disposed of by directing the respondents to appear before the Custom Authorities. The Court, however, did not stop there. It stated that even if the Custom Authorities find any non-bailable offence against the applicants (respondents herein), they shall not be arrested "without ten days prior notice to them.

64. In our judgment, on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, neither of the above directions can be said to be legal, valid or in consonance with law. Firstly, the order passed by the High Court is a blanket one as held by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Gurbaksh Singh and seeks to grant protection to respondents in respect of any non-bailable offence. Secondly, it illegally obstructs, interferes and curtails the authority of Custom Officers from exercising statutory power of arrest a person said to have committed a non-bailable offence by imposing a condition of giving ten days prior notice, a condition not warranted by law. The order passed by the High Court to the extent of directions issued to the Custom Authorities is, therefore, liable to be set aside and is hereby set aside.

Final order

65. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal filed by the Union of India is partly allowed and the directions issued and conditions imposed by the High Court on the Custom Authorities are hereby set aside.

66. Ordered accordingly.

Appeal allowed.