(Emphasis added)
In the facts and circumstances of the case, we cannot but hold that there has been a misstatement, in so far as there has been a failure to include the quantity of Rapidogens manufactured during the relevant period in the statement furnished along with the classification list as well as the declaration appended there to. The requirements of the notification in question are unambiguous and there is no warrant or scope for bona fide misconstruction. While it may be that the relevant information in regard to the manufacture of Rapidogens had been, on other occasions, supplied and was in the possession of excise authorities in answer to various queries and in the shape of gate passes, when it came to making a statement for the purpose of availing of the notification in question, the fact remains that the appellant had failed and neglected to furnish the requisite information and thereby was guilty of a mis-statement. 4. In short, the Tribunal was of the opinion that so far as fraud, suppression or misstatement of fact in the information statutorily required to be supplied to the excise authorities is concerned, question of intent is immaterial. 5. The main limb of Section 11A provides limitation of six months. In cases, where the duty is not levied or paid or short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded, it can be recovered by the appropriate officer within six months from the relevant date. (The expression "relevant date" is defined in the section itself.) But the said period of six months gets extended to five years where such non-levy, short levy, etc., is "by reason of fraud, collusion or any wilful misstatement or suppression of facts or contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of the rules with intent to evade payment of duty. 6. Now so far as fraud and collusion are concerned, it is evident that the requisite intent, i.e., intent to evade duty is built into these very words. So far as misstatement or suppression of facts are concerned, they are clearly qualified by the word "wilful" preceding the words "misstatement or suppression of facts" which means with intent to evade duty. The next set of words "contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or rules" are again qualified by the immediately following words "with intent to evade payment of duty". It is, therefore, not correct to say that there can be a suppression or misstatement of fact, which is not wilful and yet constitute a permissible ground for the purpose of the proviso to Section 11A. Misstatement or suppression of fact must be wilful. 7. Now coming to the facts of this case, the appellant's case is that he thought bona fide that he need not include the value of the Rapidogens in his declaration for the reason that the said product was fully exempt from duty under Notification No. 180/61 dated November 23, 1961. Certain facts are brought to our notice in support of this plea. It is also brought to our notice that on the date of filing of his declaration, two High Courts had taken the view that the goods exempted from duty are not includible within the definition of "excisable goods" as defined in Clause (d) of Section 2. No doubt, two other High Courts had taken a contrary view. The appellant's factory is in the State of Maharashtra and the Bombay High Court had not taken a view one way or the other. In all the circumstances, the appellant says, he was under the bona fide impression that he need not mention the value of the Rapidogens manufactured by him in his declarations. 8. In the above circumstances and because the facts establish that the misstatement of facts in the declaration filed by the appellant-or the suppression of facts therein, as the case may be-cannot be called wilful, the appeal is allowed. No order as to costs. 9. Though certain other grounds were raised in the appeal memo, the learned Counsel for the appellant has chosen not to press them and hence, need not be dealt with. Appeal allowed.