Hindustan Petroleum v. Darius Shapur Chenai (SC)
BS191744
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Before:- Dr. A.S. Anand and V.N. Khare, JJ.
Civil Appeal No. 910 of 1998. D/d.
19.8.1998.
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited - Appellant
Versus
Darius Shapur Chenai and others - Respondents
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections 17(1), 4(1), 5 and 6 - Constitution of India, 1950, Article 226 - Acquisition of land - Challenged - Ground that acquisition was not for public purpose - Acquisition proceedings initiated during pendency of eviction proceedings in a civil Court - While the writ petition was pending in the High Court, eviction suit filed by respondent was decreed - High Court set aside the acquisition proceedings stating that acquisition proceedings were initiated to circumvent the order of civil court - Supreme Court held that it was not a satisfactory way of dealing with writ petition - Order of High Court set aside - Matter remanded to High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law.
[Paras 4 to 6]
ORDER
V.N. Khare, J. - The respondent is the owner of land measuring about 1220 square yards, situate near the Secretariat Road at Hyderabad. That land had been given on lease to Caltex India Ltd. in the year 1965 for a period of ten years. The period of lease was extended from time to time. Subsequently, Caltex India Ltd. was taken over by the Government of India and all the assets and liabilities of Caltex India Ltd. which vested in the Central Government were subsequently transferred to Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. A lease was entered into with Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., the appellant herein, by the respondent for a further period of five years in 1979. The lease period came to an end on 1-8-1984. The respondent thereupon initiated eviction proceedings by filing a suit before the learned Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, after notice for eviction was issued by the respondent to the appellant on 3-4-1984. The suit was instituted in 1985. It appears that during the pendency of the suit, at the request of the appellant, the land was sought to be acquired by the State. A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was initially issued in 1985 which, however, lapsed and a fresh notification came to be issued on 3-6-1989. Notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 23-10-1989. It was the case of the Acquisition Authorities that the premises, which were in occupation of the appellant, were required for a public purpose i.e. to locate a petrol bunker of the appellant. The provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act were invoked, though enquiry under Section 5 of the Act was not dispensed with.
2. The respondent challenged the acquisition proceedings on various grounds. It was, inter alia, asserted in the writ petition that acquisition was not for public purpose but for extraneous considerations to help the dealer of the appellant to continue to retain possession of the premises. While the writ petition was pending in the High Court, the suit for eviction filed by the respondent was decreed on 29-6-1990. The High Court, vide impugned order, allowed the writ petition and set aside the acquisition proceedings. By special leave, the appellant has put in issue the order of the High Court dated 27-3-1997.
3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
4. The manner in which the writ petition was dealt with by the High Court leaves much to be desired. In the words of the High Court:
'But the fact remains that acquisition proceedings were initiated during pendency of eviction proceedings in a civil court and eviction proceedings went in favour of the plaintiff/petitioner herein. Further, invoking Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of installing a petrol pump is not correct. On a perusal of records, it is clear that the acquisition proceedings are initiated to circumvent the orders of the civil court and to prevent the petitioner from getting back the property. The reasons given by the authorities to acquire the land are quite irrelevant. There is no honest application of mind on their part to invoke the urgency clause. Hence, in our considered view, the acquisition proceedings are illegal.'
5. The above paragraph is the only discussion in the judgment setting aside the acquisition proceedings. To say the least, it was not a satisfactory way of dealing with the writ petition. Arguable points had been raised in the writ petition, which had also been controverted by the appellant in the counter filed to the same. The High Court did not advert to the pleadings and did not even record any finding as to whether the acquisition was for a public purpose or not. It did not even advert to the question, as alleged by the respondent, that the acquisition was a colourable exercise of power. The impugned order of the High Court, having not dealt with any of the relevant issues and basing itself only on the effect of eviction proceedings, where a decree for eviction was admittedly made after the acquisition proceedings were concluded and the writ petition challenging the same was pending in the High Court, cannot be sustained.
6. We, therefore, accept this appeal and set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remand the writ petition to the High Court for its fresh disposal in accordance with law. We request the High Court to dispose of the writ petition expeditiously.
7. The High Court may permit the parties to file additional pleadings, if any, for deciding the writ petition.
8. It is clarified that nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as any expression of opinion on the merits of the controversy between the parties.
9. Appeal allowed in the above terms. The parties shall bear their own costs.
Appeal allowed.