Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan , (SC) BS201411
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Before:- S.B. Sinha and Cyriac Joseph, JJ.

Civil Appeal No. 4646 of 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8205 of 2007). D/d. 23.7.2009.

Reshma Kumari and others - Appellants

Versus

Madan Mohan and another - Respondents

WITH Civil Appeal No. 4645 of 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 21649 of 2006).

Smt. Puneet Kaur and others - Appellants

Versus

Delhi Transport Corporation - Respondents

And Civil Appeal No. 4647 of 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) No 6791 of 2006).

Anjani Singh and others - Appellants

Versus

Salauddin and others - Respondents

For the Appellant :- Mr. Ashok K. Mahajan, Advocate.

For the Respondent :- For M/S Law Associates & Co., Advocates with Dr. Sushil Balwada and Ms. A. Subhashini, Advocates.

A. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Sections 166 and 163A read with Second Schedule - Compensation - Fatal Motor Accident - Compensation in case of "no fault liability" vis-a-vis "fault liability" - Claim filed by legal heirs under Section 166 (fault liability) and accordingly compensation worked out - Had the heirs filed claim for compensation under Section 163A (no fault liability), then they would have got more amount of compensation by applying Second Schedule - Question is whether in such a case claimants are entitled to get compensation by applying Second Schedule appended to Section 163A of the Act - There are divergent judicial views on this point - Matter referred to larger bench.

[Paras 43 and 44]

B. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 166 - Compensation - Fatal Motor Accident - Claimants are compensated for loss of their dependency - Compensation not to be treated as windfall.

[Para 20]

C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 166 - Compensation - Motor accident - Grant of compensation is based on principle of restitution in integrum whereunder a person received that sum of money which would put him in the same position as he would have been, if he had not sustained the wrong.

[Para 30]

D. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 163A read with Second Schedule - Claim for compensation filed under Section 163A - "No fault liability" - In case of fatal accident resulting in death, amount specified in second schedule depending upon age and income of deceased is to be paid as compensation for which multiplier is not to be applied at all - However, compensation in case of permanent disability is to be arrived at by multiplying the annual loss of income by multiplier applicable to age of injured.

[Para 41]

E. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 166 - Fatal Motor Accident - Compensation for loss of future earnings - Not possible to lay down any rigid tests which would be applied in all situations to determine such amount for loss of future prospects - However, Court observed that in wake of changed societal conditions and global scenario, future prospects to be taken into consideration not only with regard to status of employee, his educational qualification, past performance but also with regard to higher salaries and perks offered by private companies these days.

[Para 34]

Cases Referred :-

General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas [(1994)2 SCC 176]

U.P. State Road Transport Corporation. v. Trilok Chandra, 1996(2) RRR 718:(1996)4 SCC 362.

Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2001(1) RCR (Civil) 559 :(2001)2 SCC 9

United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan, 2002(3) RCR (Civil) 534 : [(2002)6 SCC 281]

Jyoti Kaul v. State of M.P. [(2002)6 SCC 306].

New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Pathak, 2007(3) RCR (Civil) 593 : 2007(4) RAJ 131 : 2007(10) SCC 1.

Sarla Dixit v. Balwant Yadav, 1996(2) RRR 90 : [(1996)3 SCC 179].

Abati Bezbaruah v. Dy. Director General, Geological Survey of India [(2003)3 SCC 148].

Davies v. Powell Duff Regulation Associated Colliers Ltd. [1942 AC 601].

Bhagwandas v. Mohd. Arif, AIR 1988 Andhra Pradesh 99.

A.P.S.R.T.C. v. Shafiya Khatoon ( AIR 1985 Andhra Pradesh 83).

Wells v. Wells [[1998]3 W.L.R. 329].

Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. [(1880)5 AC 25].

Gobald Motor Service Ltd., Allahabad v. R.M.K. Veluswami [ AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1].

Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Co, Ltd. {1951 AC 601}.

Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Jashuben, 2008(2) RCR (Civil) 91 : 2008(2) RAJ 62 : [(2008)4 SCC 162].

JUDGMENT

S.B. Sinha, J. - Application of the principles for grant of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short 'the 1939 Act') and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short 'the 1988 Act') is the question involved herein. Before, embarking on the said question we may notice the fact of the matters involved in each case.

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 8205/2007

2. Madan Mohan Singh Saini met with an accident on 3rd September, 1987, when the scooter on which he was riding, collided with a Maruti van, driven by respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 2 is the insurer. He was admitted to Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital where he succumbed to his injuries on 8th September, 2006.

Appellants herein who are, wife, children and mother of the deceased filed a claim petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, New Delhi, under Sections 110A and 92A of the Act.

By an award dated 13th July, 1992 the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 3,36,000/- by way of compensation with 12% interest from the date of filing of the claim petition.

3. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said amount, appellants filed an appeal being FAO before the High Court of Delhi. A learned Single Judge of the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment and order dated 8th February, 2007 enhanced the compensation by Rs. 17,000/-.

The appellants still dissatisfied have filed the present appeal by obtaining special leave.

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 21649 of 2006.

4. Jagmohan Singh, (deceased), husband of appellant No. 1; father of appellant Nos. 2 and 3 and son of appellant Nos. 4 and 5, died in an accident with a D.T.C. bus.

The appellants filed a claim petition before the Additional District Judge/Motor Vehicle Accident Tribunal, Ghaziabad claiming a sum of Rs. 27,50,000/- by way of compensation.

By its order dated 21st May, 1996 a sum of Rs. 2,88,000/- with 12% interest thereon from the date of filing of the claim petition, was awarded.

5. Feeling dissatisfied, the appellants filed an FAO before the Allahabad High Court. A Division Bench of the said Court by its judgment and order dated 26th May, 2006 enhanced the amount of compensation to Rs. 4,08,000/-.

Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment, the appellants have preferred this appeal by special leave.

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 6791 of 2007.

6. Sergeant Dalbir Singh died in a road accident on 17th September, 1997 with a truck which was driven by respondent No.1. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are the owner and insurance company respectively.

The appellants, who are the legal heirs, i.e. wife, children and mother of the deceased, filed a claim petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Faridabad under Sections 166 and 140 of the 1988 Act for grant of compensation of Rs. 15,00,000/-. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal by its award dated 26th June, 2000 awarded a sum of Rs. 2,49,600/- with 12% interest on the said amount by way of compensation.

7. Feeling dissatisfied, appellants filed an FAO before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh and by the impugned judgment and order, a learned Single Judge of the High Court partly allowed the appeal and enhanced the amount compensation by Rs. 1,20,600/- besides interest @ 6% per annum on the enhanced compensation.

8. The common questions which arise for our consideration in these appeals are :-

Before we, however, advert to the said questions we may notice that Section 163A of the Act was inserted on or about 14th November, 1994.

9. Even prior to the enactment of the said provision, this Court in General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas and others [(1994)2 SCC 176] following the decisions of the English Courts applied structured formula for determination of the amount of compensation. The principle with regard to the determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the structured formula in Susamma Thomas (supra) was considered having regard to the decision of Diplock, J in his speech in Mallett's case [(1970) AC 166 : (1969)2 All England Reporter 178 178]. We would refer to Mallett (supra) a little later but we may at this stage notice that the principle laid down therein has been stated to be logically sound and legally well established.

10. So far as the question of loss of future earnings on the basis of average life expectancy is concerned, this Court, having regard to the phraseology used in Section 110B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 envisaging payment of just compensation to the victims and/or the successors of the deceased, stated that any application of a rigid formula may not be applied.

In Susamma Thomas (supra) it was observed that the multiplier method is the appropriate one which should ordinarily be not departed from save in rare and extraordinary circumstances and very exceptional cases. The rationale for applying the said principle was laid down stating :-

11. It is, however, of some significance to notice that at the relevant point of time the rate of bank interest was about 12% per annum to which reference has also been made by the High Court at some length.

12. In Susamma Thomas (supra) apart from applying the structured formula with regard to the determination of the amount of compensation as regards the future prospect, it was opined :-

13. Parliament thereafter inserted Section 163A and the Second Schedule in the Act. One of the features thereof which we may immediately notice is that it provides for claim of compensation in a case involving no fault, stating :-

14. After the aforementioned provision was brought in the Statute Book, this Court had the occasion to consider the applicability of the structured formula once again in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation. v. Trilok Chandra, 1996(2) RRR 718 : [(1996)4 SCC 362]. Ahmadi, C.J. noticed certain discrepancies therein and inter alia pointed out :-

15. However, it is pertinent to notice that the Bench categorically laid down that those mistakes are limited to actual calculations only and not in respect of other items. It was emphasised that the multiplier cannot exceed 18 years' purchase factor. It noticed that the same was an improvement over the earlier position that ordinarily it should not exceed 16.

This Court stated the law thus :-

16. We may place on record that despite the recommendations made by this Court in Trilok Chandra (supra) the Parliament did not amend the Second Schedule.

17. We must also place on record that according to Mr. Atul Nanda, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Insurance Company, the Second Schedule does not contain any such mistake. Be that as it may this Court even in subsequent decisions reiterated the said principle in a large number of cases. We would, however, notice only a few of them.

In Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2001(1) RCR (Civil) 559 : [(2001)2 SCC 9] this Court observed :-

In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan, 2002(3) RCR (Civil) 534 : [(2002)6 SCC 281] this Court held :-

It is evident from the above that this Court in the said decision had taken a departure from the Second Schedule.

In Jyoti Kaul v. State of M.P. [(2002)6 SCC 306] multiplier of 15 was adopted, stating :-

18. The said decisions have not yet been overruled. We may, however, immediately notice that recently this Court had advocated application of a lower multiplier in cases involving Section 166 of the Act, but no legal principles have been laid down therein. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Pathak, 2007(3) RCR (Civil) 593 : 2007(4) RAJ 131 : 2007(10) SCC 1, this Court held :-

19. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that later decisions should not be followed keeping in view the binding precedents of this Court in the earlier cases. It was urged that the prospective loss of future earnings by way of career advancement as also revision in the scale of pay must be taken into consideration for the purpose of determination of the multiplicand while applying the structured formula contained in the Second Schedule appended to the Act.

20. The compensation which is required to be determined must be just. While the claimants are required to be compensated for the loss of their dependency, the same should not be considered to be a windfall. Unjust enrichment should be discouraged. This Court cannot also lose sight of the fact that in given cases, as for example death of only son to a mother, she can never be compensated in monetary terms.

21. The question as to the methodology required to be applied for determination of compensation as regards prospective loss of future earnings, however, as far as possible should be based on certain principles. A person may have a bright future prospect; he might have become eligible to promotion immediately; there might have been chances of an immediate pay revision, whereas in another the nature of employment was such that he might not have continued in service; his chance of promotion, having regard to the nature of employment may be distant or remote. It is, therefore, difficult for any court to lay down rigid tests which should be applied in all situations. There are divergent views. In some cases it has been suggested that some sort of hypotheses or guess work may be inevitable. That may be so.

22. As regards future prospects for determination of compensation, some precedents may also be noticed by us.

In Sarla Dixit v. Balwant Yadav, 1996(2) RRR 90 : [(1996)3 SCC 179], this Court has held :-

In Abati Bezbaruah v. Dy. Director General, Geological Survey of India, [(2003)3 SCC 148] it was observed :-

23. Learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in the appeal filed against the Award which is subject matter of SLP (C) No. 8205 of 2007 opined that one of the two methods adopted to determine the amount of compensation in fatal accident actions is the multiplier method adopted in Davies v. Powell Duff Regulation Associated Colliers Ltd. [1942 AC 601]. According to learned Judge it takes care of future prospects. A statement has been appended, which we intend to reproduce hereinafter for consideration as to whether the assumption made by him that the Second Schedule takes care of inflation of interest, loss of future prospects, is correct. The statement reads, thus:-

S.No.

Year

Money in interest 12% Loss of dependency

Excess of Capital for 87-95 (Assuming 10% interest over

Account 10% for 95-02 increase every year

Dependency 8% for year 02-12

1.

1987-88

3,36,000

40,320

1344 x 12 = 16128

24,192

2.

1988-89

3,60,192

43,223

1478 x 12 = 17736

25,487

3.

1989 - 90

3,85,679

46,281

1625 x 122 = 19500

26,781

4.

1990 - 91

4,12,461

49,495

1787 x 12 = 21444

28,051

5.

1991 - 92

4,69,793

52,861

1965 x 12 = 25932

29,281

6.

1992 - 93

4,69,793

56,375

2161 x 12 = 25932

30,443

7.

1993 - 94

5,00,236

60,028

2376 x 12 = 28512

31,516

8.

1994 - 95

5,31,753

63,810

2613 x 12 = 31356

32,454

9.

1995 - 96

5,64,207

56,421

2874 x 12 = 34,488

21,933

10.

1996 - 97

5,86,140

58,614

3161 x 12 = 37931

20,682

11.

1997 - 98

6,06,822

60,682

3476 x 12 = 41712

18,970

12.

1998 - 99

6,25,792

62,579

3823 x 12 = 45,876

16,703

13.

1999 - 00

6,42,495

64,250

4205 x 12 = 50460

13,790

14.

2000 - 01

6,56,285

65,628

4625 x 12 = 55500

10,128

15.

2001 - 02

6,66,413

66,641

5087 x 12 = 61044

5,597

16.

2002 - 03

6,72,010

55,761

5595 x 12 = 67140

13,379

17.

2003 - 04

6,58,631

52,960

6154 x 12 - 73848

21,558

18.

2004 - 05

6,37,474

50,998

6769 x 12 = 81228

30,230

19.

2005 - 06

6,07,224

48,579

7445 x 12 = 89340

40,881

20.

2006 - 07

5,66,363

45,309

8189 x 12 = 98268

52,959

21.

2007 - 08

5,12,404

41,072

9007 x 12 = 108084

67,012

22.

2008 - 09

4,46,393

35,711

9907 x 12 = 118884

83,173

22.

2009 - 10

3,63,220

29,058

10897 x 12= 130764

1,01,706

24.

2010 - 11

1,61,514

20,291

11986 x 12=143832

1,22,911

25.

2011 - 12

1,38,603

11,088

13184x12=158208

1,47,120

24. An attempt has been made by the learned Judge to show that till the 15th year, there will be an excess of interest over dependency. The excess interest can be capitalized for the next year and after 15 years, the capital is eroded and stands completely eroded in the 25th year.

25. Mr. Nanda, learned counsel appearing for the insurance company, however, submits that not only earning growth but also inflation and uncertainty of life are taken care of by applying the structured formula. In support of the aforementioned proposition reliance has been placed upon the decision of Bhagwandas v. Mohd. Arif, AIR 1988 Andhra Pradesh 99 wherein the learned Judge opined :-

As regards application of actuary's-multiplier, the learned Judge stated :-

This involves two exercises :

26. Decisions of English, Australian, Canada, U.S.A., Switzerland as also the Netherland Courts were liberally applied. The learned Judge applied Mallet case (supra) in the Indian context and the decisions of the different High Courts where principles were either applied taking into consideration the rate of interest, inflation etc There has been no decision rendered either by the High Court or this Court as to what is the real rate of interest which would be appropriate in India and what multiplier should be applied in this country.

27. We may at this juncture refer back to Mallet case (supra). We may at once notice the formula applied therein which is to the following effect :-

S.No. Year Capital Formula
1. 1st year 0 150 x 12 = 1800
2. 2nd year 1800 1800x1.045-100= 1781
3. 3rd year 1781 1761.14
4. 4th year 1761.14 1740.39
5. 5th year 1740.39 1718.71
6. 6th year 1718.71 1596.05
7. 7th year 1596.05 1672.37
8. 8th year 1672.37 1647.62
9. 9th year 1647.62 1621.76
10. 10th year 1621.76 1594.74
11. 11th year 1594.74 1800x1.045-200=1566.51
12. 12th year 1466.51 1382.50
13. 13th year 1332.50 1192.46
14. 14th year 1192.46 1046.13
15. 15th year 1046.46 893.20
16. 16th year 893.20 733.40
17. 17 year 733.40 566.40
18. 18th year 566.40 391.89
19. 19th year 391.89 209.52
20. 20th year 209.52 18.95

Lord Diplock observed :-

28. We may also notice a later decision of House of Lords in Wells v. Wells [[1998]3 W.L.R. 329]. It was a case where the plaintiff had sustained serious injuries classified as injuries of maximum severities. The question before the House was whether a lump-sum award could be made which takes into account all of the elements of future loss as well as the loss for the past. It was opined that index linked Government securities should be accepted as the best guide to calculate the appropriate discount rate. Lord Hope of Craighead supplemented the reasonings of Denning, L.J., stating :-

It was furthermore observed :-

29. The Parliament enacted the Actuaries Act, 2006. However, its activities are little known. We do not know whether any Actuarial Society has come into effect. It is also not clear what sort of service is being rendered by it. Not much assistance, therefore, can be derived from referring to the said Act to which our attention has been drawn by Mr. Nanda.

30. Indisputably, grant of compensation involving an accident is within the realm of law of torts. It is based on the principle of restitution in integrum. The said principle provides that a person entitled to damages should, as nearly as possible, get that sum of money which would put him in the same position as he would have been if he had not sustained the wrong. [See Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. [(1880)5 AC 25].

31. The accident may result in death; it may result in injuries which may be of different counts. When a death occurs the benefit accruing to the dependent must be taken into account ; the balance of loss and gain to him must be ascertained ; the position of each dependent in each case may have to be considered separately [ See Davis v. Powell Duffrya Associated Collieries Ltd. [(1942) AC 601]. The said principle has been applied by this Court in Gobald Motor Service Ltd., Allahabad v. R.M.K. Veluswami [ AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1] as also in Susamma Thomas (supra)

32. The heads of pecuniary loss are basically two. One, loss of earnings upto the date of trial and the other, loss of future earnings. Principally we are concerned with the second issue herein. For calculating future earning, the following factors are taken into consideration :-

Whereas in the first and third method, interest method for all intent and purport has not been applied in India. Multiplier method was applied as a mode of estimating the present value as a loss of benefit to the dependent in Davis (supra) wherein it was observed :

The said principle was reiterated in Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Co, Ltd. {1951 AC 601} wherein it was observed :-

33. An element of sentiment of the deceased was also introduced while determining compensation payable to the dependent. One of the factors which had been taken into consideration in Davis (supra) was that the widow might be again married and ceases to be dependent; in India, we cannot proceed on such presumption.

34. In the Indian context several other factors should be taken into consideration including education of the dependents and the nature of job. In the wake of changed societal conditions and global scenario, future prospects may have to be taken into consideration not only having regard to the status of the employee, his educational qualification; his past performance but also other relevant factors, namely - the higher salaries and perks which are being offered by the private companies these days. In fact while determining the multiplicand this Court in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Jashuben and others, 2008(2) RCR (Civil) 91 : 2008(2) RAJ 62 : [(2008)4 SCC 162] held that even dearness allowance and perks with regard thereto from which the family would have derived monthly benefit, must be taken into consideration.

35. One of the incidental issues which has also to be taken into consideration is inflation.

36. Is the practice of taking inflation into consideration wholly incorrect ? Unfortunately, unlike other developed countries in India there has been no scientific study. It is expected that with the rising inflation the rate of interest would go up. In India it does not happen. It, therefore, may be a relevant factor which may be taken into consideration for determining the actual ground reality. No hard and fast rule, however, can be laid down therefor.

37. A large number of English decisions have been placed before us by Mr. Nanda to contend that inflation may not be taken into consideration at all. While the reasonings adopted by the English courts and its decisions may not be of much dispute, we cannot blindly follow the same ignoring ground realities.

38. We have noticed the precedents operating in the field as also the rival contentions raised before us by the learned counsel for the parties with a view to show that law is required to be laid down in clearer terms. The Second Schedule refers to Section 163A of the 1988 Act, which, as noticed hereinbefore, provides for quantum of compensation to a third party in case of fatal accident or injuries suffered. It provides for a table. It specifies the amount required to be paid to the legal heirs/representatives of the deceased in the case of fatal accident and the claimants in the case of injuries suffered by them depending upon his age and annual income as specified therein. The question which arises for consideration is as to whether the multiplier specified in the second schedule should be taken to be a guide for calculation of amount of compensation payable in a case falling under Section 166 of the 1988 Act ?

39. We have noticed hereinbefore that in Patricia Jean Mahajan (supra) and Abati Bezbaruah and the other cases following them multiplier specified in the Second Schedule has been taken to be guiding factor for calculation of the amount of compensation even in a case under Section 166 of the Act. However, in Shanti Pathak (supra) this Court advocated application of lesser multiplier, although no legal principle has been laid therein.

40. In Trilok Chandra (supra) this Court has pointed out certain purported calculation mistakes in the Second Schedule. It, however, appears to us that there is no mistake therein. Amount of compensation specified in the Second Schedule only is required to be paid even if a higher or lower amount can be said to be the quantum of compensation upon applying the multiplier system.

41. Section 163A of the 1988 Act does not speak of application of any multiplier. Even the Second Schedule, so far as the same applies to fatal accident, does not say so. The multiplier, in terms of the Second Schedule, is required to be applied in a case of disability in non fatal accident. Consideration for payment of compensation in the case of death in a 'no fault liability' case vis-a-vis the amount of compensation payable in a case of permanent total disability and permanent partial disability in terms of the Second Schedule is to be applied by different norms. Whereas in the case of fatal accident the amount specified in the Second Schedule depending upon the age and income of the deceased is required to be paid wherefor the multiplier is not to be applied at all but in a case involving permanent total disability or permanent partial disability the amount of compensation payable is required to be arrived at by multiplying the annual loss of income by the multiplier applicable to the age of the injured as on the date of determining the compensation and in the case of permanent partial disablement such percentage of compensation which would have been payable in the case of permanent total disablement as specified under item (a) of the Second Schedule.

42. The Parliament in its wisdom thought to provide for a higher amount of compensation in case of permanent total disablement and proportionate amount of compensation in case of permanent partial disablement depending upon the percentage of disability.

43. Thus, prima facie, it appears that the multiplier mentioned in the Second Schedule, although in a given case, may be taken to be a guide but the same is not decisive. To our mind, although a probable amount of compensation as specified in the Second Schedule in the event the age of victim is 17 or 20 years and his annual income is Rs. 40,000/-, his heirs/legal representatives is to receive a sum of Rs. 7,60,000/-, however, if an application for grant of compensation is filed in terms of Section 166 of the 1988 Act that much amount may not be paid, although in the former case the amount of compensation is to be determined on the basis of 'no fault liability' and in the later on 'fault liability' In the aforementioned situation the Courts, we opine, are required to lay down certain principles.

44. We are not unmindful of the Statement of Objects and Reasons to Act 54 of 1994 for introducing Section 163A so as to provide for a new predetermined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income, which is more liberal and rational. That may be so, but it defies logic as to why in a similar situation, the injured claimant or his heirs/legal representatives, in the case of death, on proof of negligence on the part of the driver of a motor vehicle would get a lesser amount than the one specified in the Second Schedule. The Courts, in our opinion, should also bear that factor in mind.

45. Having regard to divergence of opinion and this aspect of the matter having not been considered in the earlier decisions, particularly in the absence of any clarification from the Parliament despite the recommendations made by this Court in Trilok Chandra (supra), the issue, in our opinion, shall be decided by a Larger Bench. It is directed accordingly.

46. The Registry is directed to place the matter before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders for constituting a Larger Bench.

Order accordingly.