Rameshwar Kumar v. The Collector of Gaya BS652368
PRIVY COUNCIL

Before:-Lord Shaw of Dunfermline, Lord Moulton, Sir John Edge, and Mr. Ameer,Ali.

0 D/d. 07.11.1913.

Rameshwar Kumar - Appellants

Versus

The Collector of Gaya - Respondent

On Appeal from the High Court in Bengal.

For the Respondent :- Sir Erle Richards, K.C. and Dunne, were not called upon.

Solicitors for Appellant :- W. W. Box & Co.

Solicitor for Respondent :- The Solicitor, India Office.

Administration - Court Fees - Inventory - Proceedings to amend Valuation - Limitation - Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), Section 98

Appeal from a judgment and order of the High Court (May 25, 1909) affirming a judgment and order of the District Judge of Gaya (March 2,1909).

The question for determination in the appeal was whether or not the Collector was by reason of the proviso to section 19H, Sub-Section 4, of the Court Fees Amendment Act, 1899, precluded from moving under that section for an amended valuation of the property and assets of an estate of which letters of administration with the will annexed had been issued.

On March 31, 1890, Raja Ran Bahadur Singh died, leaving a will by which he devised and bequeathed certain villages to the appellant, his son's wife, for her maintenance, and the residue of his estate to his granddaughter. An order was made for the issue of letters of administration with the will annexed to the granddaughter, but she died without taking out administration. The executors of her will, namely, the appellant and the testator's husband, applied for and were granted probate in January, 1895. The Court fees paid amounted to Rs. 22,000, being upon a valuation of the estate at 11 lakhs of rupees. On August 13,1902, the other executor having died, the appellant applied under the Probate and Administration Act, 1881, section 20, for letters of administration of the estate of Raja Ran Bahadur Singh with the will annexed. She again estimated the value at 11 lakhs or rupees and the Court fees payable at Rs. 22,000. An order was made for letters to issue and or notice to be given to the Collector of Gaya.

On May 13, 1905, a list of movable properties belonging to the estate, but without a valuation, was filed by the appellant in the District Court in response to a notice by the Collector under the Probate and Administration Act (V. of 1881), section 98, sub-section 3. A copy of this list was sent to the Collector. On July 28,1905, the Collector applied to the District Judge for a list of the movables, and a list with a detailed valuation was supplied to him. This list was one prepared under the order of the District Judge shortly after the death of Raja Ran Bahadur Singh in 1890, since which date it had been on the file of the Court.

On May 21, 1907, the Collector applied to the District Judge to order the appellant to exhibit an inventory of the estate as required by the Probate and Administration Act, 1881, section 98, and an order to that effect was made. The appellant applied to the District Judge to cancel this order upon the ground that an inventory had already been exhibited. The District Judge on September 27,1907, ordered as follows : "From the office report it appears that an inventory is already on the record. No further action is necessary." In January, 1908, the District Judge wrote to the Collector that "an inventory having already been filed and accepted by the Court no further inventory can be called or."

On July 16,1908, the Collector applied applied under the Court Fees Amendment Act (XI of 1899) section 19H, sub-section 3, to inquire into the valuation of the estate. By her petition of objection the appellant pleaded that an inventory had been exhibited and accepted by the District Court more than six months before the proceedings, which were consequently out of time under the proviso to the sub-section above referred to.

On September 19,1908, the District Judge, not being the judge who had made the order of September 27, 1907, delivered judgment against the appellant's contention and directed an inquiry into the true value of the property. The result of this inquiry was that the estate was found to be greatly undervalued.

The appellant obtained a rule nisi from the High Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, section 115. Upon cause being shewn the High Court discharged the rule and affirmed the decision of the District Judge. It became unnecessary to decide whether the High Court had jurisdiction under section 115 to set aside or vary the order of the District Judge.

De gruyther, K.C., and Dube, for the appellant. The District Judge in 1907 was satisfied that a sufficient inventory had been exhibited. The six months within which the Collector could move to amend the valuation under the Court Fees Amendment Act, 1899, section 19H, sub-section 4 must be taken to run from that date. If this is not so the administratrix may be liable for an indefinite period to make an amended valuation. In considering whether a sufficient inventory was exhibited the District Judge in 1907 rightly took into account documents filed in his Court in relation to the same estate.

JUDGMENT

The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by

07.11.1913

Lord Shaw of Dunfermline :- This is an appeal from a judgment and order of date May 25, 1909, which was pronounced by the High Court of Judicature at Port William in Bengal, and which affirmed a judgment and order of date September 23, 1908, and March 2, 1909, of the District Judge of Gaya.

The present proceedings were instituted on July 16, 1908, by an application which was made by the Collector to the District Court under Section 19H, Sub-section 4, of Act XI of 1899. Before reading that section it may be stated that the general nature of the application was to declare that no inventory of the estate of the deceased as required by law had been filed, and that the appellant was not willing to amend the valuation of the estate to the satisfaction of the Collector. In the defence lodged to those proceedings, this declinature and inability were reaffirmed by the appellant, and accordingly the proceedings have taken their course.

The, section of the Act of 1899 to which particular reference is made defines the function of the Collector in the following terms: - "The Collector, within the local limits of whose revenue jurisdiction the property of the deceased or any part thereof is, may at any time inspect or cause to be inspected, and take or cause to be taken copies of the record of any case in which application for probate or letters of administration has been made; and if, on such inspection or otherwise, he is of opinion that the petitioner has underestimated the value of the property of the deceased, the Collector may, if he thinks fit, require the attendance of the petitioner (either in person or by agent) and take evidence and inquire into the matter in such manner as he may think lit, and, if he is still of opinion that the value of the property has been underestimated, may require the petitioner to amend the valuation."

The Collector, having a strong opinion as to the valuation emerging as a lump figure in the previous proceeding, initiated these proceedings under discussion. What the appellant before their Lordships pleads is that the action or proceeding on the part of the Collector is excluded by the proviso of Sub-section 4 of the statute last quoted. That proviso is "that no such motion shall be made after the expiration of six months from the date of the exhibition of the inventory required by Section 277 of the Indian Succession Act, 1865, or, as the case may be, by Section 98 of the Probate and Administration Act, 1881."

It is, in the opinion of their Lordships, not a justifiable construction of this proviso to date the period of running from anything less than the lodging of the inventory required by the statute. It will not satisfy this proviso that six months have elapsed from a period when a certain document, which might be classed as or denominated an inventory, satisfied a District Judge or any judge. What he has to be satisfied of is that the punctum temporis from which the six months runs is the lodging of an inventory as required by Section 98. It was admitted by the earned Counsel for the appellant that accordingly the correct decision to be arrived at here depended upon the construction of certain words in Section 98, and as those are of general importance the following citation is made: "An executor or administrator shall, within six months from the grant of probate or letters of administration, exhibit in the Court by which the same has or have been granted an inventory containing a full and true estimate of all the property in possession, and all the credits, and also all the debts owing by any person or persons to which the executor or administrator is entitled in that character." The remainder of the section has no bearing on the subject in dispute in these proceedings.

Their Lordships are clearly of opinion that no inventory satisfies this statutory requirement which omits the essential of this detail, namely, that its contents shall include "a full and true estimate of all the property in possession." This being the statutory provision it is not alleged by the appellant that any one document did contain such a full and true estimate. The argument presented to their Lordships was that by massing together a variety of documents, including two which will now be referred to, and a mass of documents in another case, none of which have been brought in detail before the notice of the Board, there was, in the result, produced to the Court an inventory containing a full and true estimate.

In their Lordships' opinion the first objection to this operation, even although the operation itself as distinguished from the production of one document containing the details were legitimate, is that the first document to which reference is made is a list of the immovable property belonging to the deceased.

It has been not obscurely suggested in these proceedings that the immovable property bore the relation to the movable property of no less than at least nine in ten. So that with regard to nine tenths of the estate of the deceased nothing is supplied except a list of the properties, a list without a single figure, and containing nothing, even by approximation to the words of the statute, in the nature of a full and true estimate of the property in possession.

In their Lordships' opinion that is sufficient for the disposal of the case. Their Lordships are satisfied that a just conclusion has been arrived at by the Courts below, and they will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed, and that the appellant should pay the costs.

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