Chairman and Managing Director FCI v. Jagdish Balaram Bahira, (SC) BS877203
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Before:-Jagdish Singh Khehar, CJI, N.V. Ramana and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ.

Civil Appeal No. 8928 of 2015 Etc. Etc. D/d. 6.7.2017.

Chairman and Managing Director FCI and Ors. - Appellants

Versus

Jagdish Balaram Bahira and Ors. - Respondents

With

C.A. No.9155 of 2015, C.A. No.9157 of 2015, C.A. No. 9160 of 2015, C.A. Nos.9203-9204 of 2015, C.A. No.8926 of 2015, C.A. No.1918 of 2010, C.A. No.9154 of 2015, C.A. Nos. 9158-9159 of 2015, C.A. Nos.8604-05 of 2017 @ SLP(C) Nos.33864-33865 of 2015, C.A. No.8601 of 2017 @ SLP(C) No.289 of 2016, C.A. Nos.8602-03 of 2017 @ SLP(C) Nos.529-530 of 2016, C.A. No.8607 of 2017 @ SLP(C) No.14830 of 2015, C.A. No.8609 of 2017 @ SLP(C) No. 13409 of 2015, C.A. No.8606 of 2017 @ SLP(C) No.19992 of 2015, C.A. No. 9107 of 2015, C.A. No. 7187 of 2013, C.A. No.8598 of 2017 @ SLP(C) No.18925 of 2014, C.A. No.8597 of 2017 @ SLP(C) No.16852 of 2016, C.A. Nos.8599-8600 of 2017 @ SLP(C) Nos.29388-29389 of 2016, C.A. No.8610 of 2017 @ SLP(C) No.2299 of 2017, C.A. No.8608 of 2017 @ S.L.P.(C)...CC No. 10889 of 2015.

For the Appellants :- S.S. Shamshery, A.K. Srivastava, Ms. B. Sunita Rao, B. Krishna Prasad, Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, Ms. Anagha S. Desai, Sushil Karanjkar, K.N. Rai, Aniruddha Joshi, Rajeev Maheshwaranand Roy, Piyush Sharma, Rahul Chitnis, Aaditya Pande, Chander Shekhar Ashri, Kishor Lambat, (For M/s. Lambat and Associates), Ms. Indra Sawhney, Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Sunil Kumar Verma, Ms.Shobha Ramamoorthy, Sri Ram J.Thalapathy, V. Adhimoolam, Shilp Vinod, Kishor Lambat, Rabin Majumder, Gopal Balwant Sathe, Debesh Panda, Uday B. Dube, Advocates.

For the Respondents :- Gagan Sanghi, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, C.G. Solshe, Ms.Anagha S. Desai, Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Ms.Shubhangi Tuli, (M/s. S.M. Jadhav and Company), Mrs. Gunjan Sinha, (For M/s. M. V. Kini & Associates), E.C. Agrawala, Kishor Lambat, (For M/s. Lambat and Associates), Ms. Manju Jetley, D.S. Mahra, Suhas Kadam, (For M/s Lemax Lawyers & Co.), Nirnimesh Dube, Rahul Chitnis, Aaditya Pande, Chander Shekhar Ashri, Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, Advocates.

A. Constitution of India, 1950 Articles 14 and 16 Reservation - Usurpation of benefits - Constitutional jurisdiction - Purposive construction - Held that the constitutional policy of creating reservations sub serves a high constitutional value of providing social redress and a life of dignity to castes, tribes and classes which were in the historical sense oppressed by systematic pattern of social exclusion and human deprivation - Benefits which the Constitution has conferred on beneficiary groups cannot be dissipate by allowing others who do not belong to the designated castes or tribes to secure the benefit - Public employment is a significant source of social mobility - Access to education opens the doors to secure futures - As a matter of principle, in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction, the court must weigh against an interpretation which will protect unjust claims over the just, fraud over legality and expediency over principle - Usurpation of constitutional benefits by persons who are not entitled to them must be answered by the court in the only way permissible for an institution which has to uphold the rule of law.

[Para 5]

B. Constitution of India, 1950 Article 14, 16 and 142 Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificate Act, 2000 - Public employment - Reservation - Usurpation of benefits - Where the State embark upon public employment, it is under the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 to follow the principle of equal opportunity - Affirmative action in our Constitution is a part of the quest for substantive equality - Those for who the Constitution had made special provisions are as a result ousted when an importer who does not belong to reserved category is ousted - Judicial process should not be allowed to be utilized to protect the unscrupulous and to preserve the benefits which have accrued to an importer on the specious plea of equity - Once the legislature has stepped in, by enacting Maharashtra Act 23 of 2001, the power under Article 142 should not be exercise to defeat legislative prescription.

[Paras 46 and 57]

C. Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificate Act, 2000 - Caste certificate - Invalidation of - Plea on behalf of the persons whose castes/tribes claims have been invalidated that Maharashtra Act 23 of 2001 cannot apply to admissions or appointments which were made prior to the date on which the Act came into force repelled - Expression 'before or after the commencement of this Act' in Section 7 of the Act, 2001 indicates that the Scrutiny Committee constituted under section 6 of the Act is empowered to cancel a caste certificate whether it was issued prior to 18th October, 2001 or thereafter - Section 10 which provides for withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis of a false certificate which is withdrawn is essentially a consequences of the cancellation of the caste certificate - Absence of the word `before or after the commencement of this Act' in Section 10 makes no substantive difference because a withdrawal of benefit is an event which flows naturally and as plain consequence of the invalidation of the claim.

[Paras 49, 51 and 57]

D. Constitution of India, 1950 Article 20(1) Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificate Act, 2000, Section - False caste certificate - Punishment - Provisions of Section 11(1) must be read and construed in a prospective sense having regard to the guarantee contained in Article 20(1) of the Constitution - Offence having been created by Maharashtra Act 23 of 2001, the Act which constitutes the offence must relate to a period after the date of the enforcement of the Act - In terms of the penal provisions of Section 11, the statute in so far as it creates offences and provides for penalties must be construed prospectively.

[Paras 52 and 57]

E. Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificate Act, 2000 - False caste certificate - Invalidation of admission/appointment - Administrative circular - Held that administrative circulars and government resolutions are subservient to legislative mandate and cannot be contrary either to constitutional norms or statutory principles - No government resolution or circular can override constitutional or statutory norms - Principle that government is bound by its own circular cannot apply in a situation such as present - Protecting the services of a candidate who is found not to belong to the community or tribe for whom the reservation is intended by government circulars resolution cannot operate to legal rights of genuine members of the reserved whose entitlements are negated by the grant of a seat to an ineligible person.

[Para 53]

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Hindustan Aeronautics Limited v. Murlidhar Arjun Neware, (C.A. Nos. 8602-03 of 2017 @ SLP (C) Nos.529-30 of 2016.

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Nidhi Kaim v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2017(2) S.C.T. 150 : (2017) 4 SCC 1.

Palghat Jilla Thandan Samudhaya Samrakshna Smithi v. State of Kerala, 1994(1) S.C.T. 693 : (1994) 1 SCC 359.

Pradip Gajanan Koli v. State of Maharashtra, Civil Appeal No.8598 of 2017 @ SLP (C) 18925 of 2014.

Priyanka Omprakash Panwar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 4 Mh L.J. 847.

Punjab National Bank v. Vilas Govindrao Bokade, (2008) 14 SCC 545 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 143.

R. Unnikrishnan v. V. K. Mahanudevan, 2014(1) S.C.T. 748 : 2014(2) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 158 : (2014) 4 SCC 434.

R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala, 2004(1) S.C.T 673 : (2004) 2 SCC 105.

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Raju Ramsing Vasave v. Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar, (2008) 9 SCC 54 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 802.

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Ramesh Suresh Kamble v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 1 MhLJ 423.

Ravindra Govindrao Nagpurkar v. Secretary, Rajasthan Education Society Washim, Civil Appeal Nos.8604-05 of 2017 @ SLP (C) Nos. 33864-65 of 2015.

Regional Manager, Central Bank v. Madhulika Guru Prasad Dahir, 2008(3) RCR (Civil) 855 : 2008(3) S.C.T. 603 : AIR 2008 SC 3266.

Sandeep Subhash Parate v. State of Maharashtra, 2006(4) S.C.T. 125 : (2006) 7 SCC 501 : (2006) 8 Scale 503.

Shalini Gajananrao Dalal v. New English High School Association, 2014(1) S.C.T. 605 : (2013) 16 SCC 526.

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State of Maharashtra v. Ku. Chhaya D/o.Hemraj Nimje, Civil Appeal No. 9160 of 2015.

State of Maharashtra v. Ku. Vijaya Deorao Nandanwar, C.A. No. 9107 of 2015.

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JUDGMENT

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. - Delay condoned in SLP (C)......CC No.10889/2015.

2. Leave granted in the Special Leave Petitions.

A The perspective

3. The framers of the Constitution conceived of a policy of affirmative action to redress the social exclusion, economic deprivation and political alienation suffered by historically disadvantaged classes of Indian society. Reservation of posts in public employment and seats for admission in educational institutions and the setting apart of seats in electoral bodies was envisaged by the Constitution for the fulfilment of a constitutional aspiration of social justice to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes and to socially and educationally backward classes of citizens. In pursuit of the constitutional goal of substantive equality, reservations have been envisaged as a means of enabling members of beneficiary groups to realise, in a true sense, dignity, freedom and liberty which the Constitution guarantees as its basic philosophy. But the problem which has confronted legislatures, policy makers as well as courts (as enforcers of the rule of law) is a capture of the benefits of affirmative action programmes by persons who do not genuinely belong to the beneficiary groups. This kind of capture poses a serious dimension. When a person who does not belong to a caste, tribe or class for whom reservation is meant, seeks to pass off as its member, such a stratagem constitutes a fraud on the Constitution. For one thing a person who is dis entitled to the benefit of a welfare measure obtains the benefit. For another this deprives a beneficiary who is genuinely entitled to receive those benefits of a legitimate entitlement. This constitutes an egregious constitutional fraud. It is a fraud on the statutes which implement the provisions of the Constitution. It is a fraud on state policy. Confronted with this problem, the legislatures have intervened with statutory instruments while the executive has, in implementation of law, set down administrative parameters and guidelines to prevent the usurpation of benefits.

4. The batch of cases with which the court is confronted involves individuals who sought the benefit of public employment on the basis of a claim to belong to a beneficiary group which has, upon investigation been found to be invalid. Despite the invalidation of the claim to belong to a Scheduled Caste or, as the case may be, a Scheduled Tribe or backward community, the intervention of the Court is invoked in the exercise of the power of judicial review. The basis for the invocation of jurisdiction lies in an assertion that equities arise upon a lapse of time and these equities are capable of being protected either by the High Court (in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226) or by this Court (when it discharges the constitutional function of doing complete justice under Article 142). The present batch of cases then raises the fundamental issue as to whether such equities are sustainable at law and, if so, the limits that define the jurisdiction of the court to protect individuals who have secured access to the benefit of reservation in spite of the fact that they do not belong to the caste, tribe or class for whom reservation is intended.

5. A large body of precedent has evolved both in the High Courts as well as in this Court in seeking to find answers to pleas raised by individuals that they are entitled to protection by a constitutional court, even after the invalidation of their caste or tribe claims. The decided cases reflect a profound awareness on the part of courts of the human element involved. Assessment of human consequences case by case has resulted in a conflicting line of approach, in the effort of the court to balance the letter of law with a sense of compassion. Since this Bench of three Judges is called upon to seek a median, through the body of judicial precedent, it is, at the outset, necessary to set out the fundamental values and vision which the court must pursue. Those values as well as the vision is charted out to the court by the Constitution and it is the Constitution which the court expounds. The constitutional policy of creating reservations sub serves a high constitutional value of providing social redress and a life of dignity to castes, tribes and classes which were in a historical sense oppressed by a systemic pattern of social exclusion and human deprivation. The benefits which the Constitution has conferred on beneficiary groups cannot be dissipated by allowing others who do not belong to the designated castes or tribes to secure the benefit. Public employment is a significant source of social mobility. Access to education opens the doors to secure futures. As a matter of principle, in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction, the court must weigh against an interpretation which will protect unjust claims over the just, fraud over legality and expediency over principle. As the nation evolves, the role of the court must be as an institution which abides by constitutional principle, enforces the rule of law and reaffirms the belief that claims based upon fraud, expediency and subterfuge will not be recognised. Once these parameters are established with a clear judicial formulation individual cases should pose no problem. Usurpation of constitutional benefits by persons who are not entitled to them must be answered by the court in the only way permissible for an institution which has to uphold the rule of law. Unless the courts were to do so, it would leave open a path of incentives for claims based on fraud to survive legal gambits and the creativity of the disingenuous.

B The regulatory regime : Madhuri Patil

6. On 24 February 1981, the Government of Maharashtra issued a G.R. which prescribed the procedure for obtaining (i)caste certificates from the Sub-divisional Officers; and (ii) validity certificates from a Scrutiny Committee.

7. In 1994, the systemic usurpation of benefits by persons who did not belong to the beneficiary groups came to the fore before this Court. There was before this Court, an urgent need expressed to set down a framework to regulate the grant of caste certificates and to scrutinise claims. The need for scrutiny and verification of caste claims was addressed in a judgment of this Court, speaking through a bench of two judges, in Kumari Madhuri Patil v. Additional Commissioner, Tribal Development, 1995(1) S.C.T. 261 : (1994) 6 SCC 241. The judgment was delivered on 2 September 1994. While emphasising the need to ensure that claims to belong to a beneficiary group must be carefully scrutinised, this Court observed thus :

8. Detailed guidelines were formulated in the judgment of this Court for the constitution of committees by the State Governments for scrutinising claims of candidates to belong to a Scheduled caste or tribe or, as the case may be, to a backward community designated for reservations. The directions issued by this Court envisaged the constitution of Vigilance Cells which would conduct local enquiries to determine the authenticity of a claim to belong to a designated caste or tribe. The court, among other things, issued the following directions :

C The Halba/Halbi controversy

9. The Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order 1950 and the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order 1950 provide in relation to each State a list of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the purpose of constitutional reservations. In the list of Scheduled Tribes for the State of Maharashtra, Entry 19 is :

"Halba, Halbi"

10. In the State of Maharashtra, the ambit of Entry 19 became a bone of contention particularly with persons belonging to the Halba-Koshti community claiming to be a sub-tribe of the designated tribe. A Division Bench of the High Court spoke on the issue on 4 September 1985 in Milind Sharad Katware v. State of Maharashtra, (1986) 1 Bom CR 403. The Division Bench held that Halba-Koshti constituted a sub-division of the tribe "Halba-Halbi" under Entry 19 of the Scheduled Tribes Order, 1950. Halba-Koshtis were, in the view of the Division Bench, entitled to the status of a Scheduled Tribe on the ground that they were comprehended within a designated tribe namely, Halba-Halbi. In coming to this conclusion, the Division Bench opined that it is permissible to enquire whether a sub-division of a tribe which is not mentioned in the Scheduled Tribes Order, 1950 is nevertheless a part and parcel of a tribe which is designated.

11. Upon a challenge by the State of Maharashtra before this Court, the issue was referred to a Constitution Bench and eventually resulted in the judgment in State of Maharashtra v. Milind, 2001(1) S.C.T. 383 : (2001) 1 SCC 4. The Constitution Bench held that the Scheduled Tribes Order had to be read as it is; and no evidence could be let in to urge that a tribe or tribal community or its part constituted a part of a tribe which was specifically designated. In other words :

The judgment of the Bombay High Court holding that Halba-Koshti formed a part of the designated scheduled tribe, Halba-Halbi was reversed. The declaration of law by this Court under Article 141, negated the position of law enunciated by the Bombay High Court. This was, it must be emphasised, not a case of prospective over-ruling.

12. The Constitution Bench in Milind dwelt on the dangers in allowing benefits which are reserved to designated castes and tribes being usurped by individuals who do not belong to them. Allowing the benefits which are reserved by Presidential orders issued under Articles 341 and 342 to be usurped by an imposter would negate the purpose of the reservation. This was succinctly emphasised in the following observations of the Constitution Bench :

13. Milind Sharad Katware whose cause had travelled from the Bombay High Court in 1985 to this Court had, by the time that the Constitution Bench resolved the issue on 28 November 2000 qualified as a doctor. He claimed the benefit of equities which had intervened in the meantime. They were recognised in the ultimate directions which were issued by this Court in the following observations :

The latter part of the above extract covered other cases before the court. Reading these observations there can be no manner of doubt that this Court took recourse to its constitutional power under Article 142 to protect benefits which had accrued to a candidate who had qualified as a doctor though with the caveat that he would not be entitled to claim the status of belonging to a Scheduled tribe in the future. The latter part protected, having regard to the passage of time and interim orders passed in the batch of cases, appointments and admissions which had become final. These directions were evidently under Article 142 of the Constitution.

D The legislation in Maharashtra

14. The legislature in the State of Maharashtra enacted the Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-Notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificate Act, 2000. The legislation essentially takes care, for that state of the concerns that were expressed in the decision of this Court in Madhuri Patil by providing a statutory framework to regulate the issuance of caste certificates, scrutiny and verification of claims and the consequences to ensue upon the invalidation of a claim. The legislation received the assent of the President and was published in the gazette on 23 May 2001. By a notification dated 17 October 2001, the Act came into force from 18 October 2001, in terms of Section 1(2). Section 3 requires every person claiming to belong to a Scheduled caste or tribe, other backward class or any other designated tribe or community seeking to obtain public employment or an admission to an educational institution or contesting an electoral seat in a local authority or a co-operative society to apply for the issuance of a caste certificate to a competent authority named by the State Government. Section 4 empowers the competent authority to issue a caste certificate upon being satisfied of the genuineness of the claim. Section 6 requires the State Government to constitute Scrutiny Committees for the verification of caste certificates issued by the competent authorities constituted under Section 4(1). Sub-Section (2) of Section 6 requires the beneficiary of a caste certificate to submit an application to a Scrutiny Committee for the verification of the caste certificate and for issuance of a validity certificate. The appointing authority is similarly required by sub-Section (3) to make an application to the Scrutiny Committee to verify the caste certificate. Section 6 provides thus :

Section 7 provides for the confiscation and cancellation of "false certificates". Section 7 is in the following terms :

Section 8 relates to the burden of proof and envisages that in any application for the issuance of a caste certificate by the competent authority; in any enquiry conducted by the competent authority or Scrutiny Committee or appellate authority; and in the trial of any offence under the Act, the burden of proving that the person belongs to such caste, tribe or class shall be on the claimant - applicant. Section 10 provides for the consequence of the invalidation of a caste certificate and reads thus :

Section 11 deals with offences and penalties and provides thus :

Offences punishable under Section 11 have been made cognisable and non bailable under Section 12. Section 13 imposes criminal penalties upon a person discharging the functions of a competent authority who intentionally issues a false caste certificate.

15. Legislative intervention in the State of Maharashtra by the enactment of 2000 puts into place a statutory framework covering the area from the issuance of caste/tribe certificates and traversing the scrutiny and verification of caste/tribe claims and withdrawal of benefits accruing upon a false claim. Stringent penalties are provided against violators by creating a regime of criminal offences which are punishable at law. An application for a caste certificate is required to be made to a designated authority constituted by the State Government. The competent authority has to be satisfied about the genuineness of the claim before it issues a caste certificate. Issuance of a caste certificate does not in itself conclude the level of scrutiny. The next stage of scrutiny is contemplated before the Scrutiny Committee which is conferred with a statutory status by the provisions of the Act. Section 6 mandates in sub-section (2) that a person who desires to avail of a benefit or concession provided to a designated caste, tribe or class must make an application well in time to the Scrutiny Committee for verification of the caste certificate and for the issuance of a validity certificate. Not only this, the appointing authority is obligated to move the Scrutiny Committee to conduct a verification of the caste certificate of a person who has been selected for appointment. Section 7 empowers the Scrutiny Committee either suo motu or otherwise to enquire into the correctness of a caste certificate and, if it is of the opinion that the certificate was obtained fraudulently, it shall cancel and confiscate it after furnishing a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Section 7 operates in respect of all caste certificates whether obtained before or after the commencement of the Act. If a caste certificate has been obtained falsely by a person either claiming himself or his children to belong to a designated caste, tribe or class, the Scrutiny Committee is empowered to cancel it upon an opinion formed that it was obtained fraudulently. The fact that a person belongs to a designated caste, tribe or class is based on facts which are to the knowledge of the applicant and hence the burden of proof is placed on the claimant by Section 8.

16. The state legislature was evidently not content with a mere invalidation of a caste certificate which is founded on a false claim made by a candidate to belong to a designated caste, tribe or class. Section 6 (2) provides that a candidate who desires to obtain a benefit must apply well in time to the Scrutiny Committee for verification and similarly the appointing authority of a candidate who has been selected for appointment but has not obtained a validity certificate must apply to the Scrutiny Committee for verification. The legislature however was cognizant of the fact that by the time a scrutiny takes place before the Scrutiny Committee the candidate may have obtained the benefit of a concession reserved for a caste, tribe or class. As a matter of public interest, the legislation stipulates that the benefits which have been obtained on the basis of a false caste certificate shall be withdrawn upon the invalidation of the claim by the Scrutiny Committee. The ambit of Section 10 (1) extends, among other things, to an admission which is secured in an educational institution against a seat reserved for one of the designated castes, tribes or classes; an appointment in the government, local authority or corporation owned or controlled by the government or any government institution or co-operative society against a reserved post. A benefit which is obtained on the foundation of a false caste claim which has been invalidated is not permitted to be retained by the candidate. There is a legislative mandate that the benefit of an admission granted or an appointment to a post shall be withdrawn forthwith on the cancellation of a caste/tribe certificate. Any amount which is paid by way of scholarship, grant, allowance or financial benefits has to be recovered as arrears of land revenue. Sub-Section (3) of Section 10 contains a non-obstante provision as a result of which notwithstanding anything contained in any Act for the time being in force a degree, diploma or educational qualification acquired by a person after securing admission on the basis of a caste certificate which is proved to be false and is cancelled would also be invalid. Similarly, by sub-Section (4) a disqualification from holding an electoral office has been stipulated where a person has contested an election on the basis of a false caste certificate which is since cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee. To ensure that the stringent provisions made by it impose a sufficient deterrent, the legislature considered it fit in its wisdom to create offences and to impose criminal penalties in Section 11.

17. The consequences which emanate from the cancellation of a caste certificate are distinct. The first is the withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis of a claim to belong to a designated tribe, group or class which has been held to be invalid. This is of a civil nature by which the applicant is deprived of the benefits of a false caste certificate which is cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee. The second consequence is the liability to be subject to a criminal prosecution. This is a criminal liability arising from an offence created by the legislature.

E Precedent

18. Several decisions of this Court have considered whether a person who has secured the benefit of public employment or admission to an educational institution on a reserved quota is entitled to retain the benefits obtained despite the invalidation of the claim to belong to the tribe or caste. In all such cases, equities are pressed in aid, chief among them being the lapse of time since the acquisition of benefits on the basis of a claim to belong to a designated caste or tribe. As decided cases indicate, the claim for equity is coupled with a "voluntary" undertaking that the person would not secure or claim any future benefits on the basis that he or she belongs to the Scheduled Caste, Schedule Tribe or socially and educationally backward class on the basis of which the original appointment or admission was obtained. In the case of admissions to educational institutions, particularly institutions of higher learning, the additional ground which is often urged is that the withdrawal of benefits obtained in the past would amount to a societal loss since scarce productive resources of the nation are invested in providing for training and education to professionals in a discipline such as medicine.

19. In Madhuri Patil (supra), a Bench of two learned Judges set down a principled rationale as to why a claim for equity by a person who is not found to belong to the designated caste, tribe or class cannot be countenanced. The Court observed :

However, on the facts of that case the Bench of two Judges while upholding the cancellation of the status of Mahadeo Koli which was fraudulently obtained, directed that the student who had completed the course of medical studies be allowed to appear for the final year examination of the M.B.B.S. degree course but not as a candidate belonging to a Scheduled Tribe. The circumstance which weighed with the Court was that the student had approached the High Court for the grant of a caste certificate since the Additional Commissioner was not dealing with the matter. The student obtained admission pursuant to a direction of the High Court. It was the parents of the student who had put the career of the student in jeopardy and since she had completed her course of study except to appear for the examination; she should be permitted to do so. The above directions were issued in the case of one of the two appellants, Suchita Laxman Patil. However, her sister Madhuri (who was the first appellant) was found to have approached an officer without jurisdiction and after showing the order of the High Court in the case of her sister Suchita, secured a caste certificate and got admission. This Court observed that though she was in the midst of her B.D.S. studies in the second year, she could not continue as a student belonging to Mahadeo Koli Scheduled Tribe. She could only obtain admission as a general candidate and continue her studies. These directions are referable to the jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Article 142.

20. The next decision which is of relevance on the issue, is a judgment of three Judges of this Court in R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala, 2004(1) S.C.T 673 : (2004) 2 SCC 105. In that case the appellant who did not belong to a designated reserved community obtained a caste certificate and was selected as a Deputy Superintendent of Police on a seat reserved for the Scheduled Castes. However, it was found upon a complaint that the appellant did not belong to a Scheduled Caste and the Scrutiny Committee rejected his claim. The order of the Scrutiny Committee was upheld by the High Court and by this Court. Subsequently at the behest of the appellant the Central Administrative Tribunal directed that he should not be terminated from service without following the procedure under Article 311. The High Court reversed that decision and the appellant was dismissed from service. Before this Court the appellant inter alia sought protection since he had rendered nearly 27 years of service. Rejecting the submission this Court held that :

The Bench of three Judges also rejected the submission that since the appellant had rendered 27 years of service, the order of dismissal should be substituted with an order of compulsory retirement or removal to protect his pensionary benefits. The Court observed :

21. In Bank of India v. Avinash D. Mandivikar, 2005(4) S.C.T. 336 : (2005) 7 SCC 690 the first respondent obtained an appointment in the service of the bank in October 1976 on a post reserved for the Scheduled Tribes. The Scrutiny Committee found that he did not belong to a Scheduled Tribe and, therefore, invalidated the caste certificate. Following the termination of his services the first respondent moved the High Court which accepted his plea that the initiation of proceedings against him by the Scrutiny Committee for verification of the caste certificate in 1987 was beyond a reasonable period. The High Court, while allowing the plea, reinstated him in service with back-wages. In an appeal by the employer, this Court held that once a claim of the employee to belong to a Scheduled Tribe had been rejected, the employment was "no appointment in eye of law" and that he had "absolutely no justification for his claim" in respect of the post he usurped. Distinguishing the directions issued in Milind (under Article 142), this Court held that :

The above observations of the court are also an indication that para 38 of the decision in Milind was construed as consisting of directions issued under Article 142. For it was on that basis that the court in Avinash Mandivikar held that no case was made out for protecting the services of a bank employee who had obtained employment on the basis of a false claim. Besides, this Court also held that the first respondent having perpetrated a fraud, a claim for protection will not be legally sustainable and a person who had obtained employment by illegitimate means could not continue to enjoy the fruits of the appointment despite the clear finding by the Scrutiny Committee that "he does not even have a shadow of a right even to be considered for appointment". This Court relied upon the earlier decision in Vishwanatha Pillai (supra) in coming to its conclusion.

22. Another decision of two learned Judges was in Additional General Manager/Human Resources, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. Suresh Ramakrishna Burde, 2007(3) S.C.T. 202 : (2007) 5 SCC 336 where a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court had ordered reinstatement subject to the condition that the employee would not stake a claim to belong to the Scheduled Tribe in future. The claim of the employee to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe was invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee. The employee had been appointed in May 1982 to a clerical post and in August 1995 the Scrutiny Committee had invalidated the caste claim initially and again in August 2001 following an order of remand. A Writ Petition filed against the order of invalidation was withdrawn but thereafter, relying on the observations in the concluding paragraph in Milind (supra) the employee submitted a representation for the protection of his services. After the representation was rejected, the employee moved the High Court which directed his reinstatement but with the condition that he would not claim the benefit of belonging to a Schedule Caste in future. While construing the decision in Milind (supra) (upon which the High Court had placed reliance), this Court observed as follows :

In this view of the matter, the High Court was held to be in error in setting aside the order of termination and in directing reinstatement of the employee.

23. A Bench of two Judges of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sanjay K. Nimje, 2007(1) S.C.T. 750 : 2007(1) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 531 : (2007) 14 SCC 481 considered a case where the respondent had been appointed to the service of the state in June 1995 on a claim that he belonged to the Halba Scheduled Tribe. The Scrutiny Committee upon verifying the caste certificate found in its order of August 1989 that the employee was a Koshti (a Special Backward Class) and not a Halba. The respondent accepted the findings of the Scrutiny Committee but on the basis of a Government Resolution dated 15 June 1995 sought the protection of his service. This Court noted that on 7 December 1994 Koshtis were declared to be a Special Backward Class. As regards the G.R. dated 15 June 1995, this Court came to the conclusion that since the respondent was appointed on 29 June 1995, which was after the G.R., he was not entitled to protection in terms thereof. Moreover, adverting to Section 10 of the Act enacted by the Maharashtra state legislature, this Court observed that :

In the view of this Court :

Finally this Court held that the provisions of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 must apply. Though at one point in time indulgence had been shown to students or to persons who were found to have acted bona fide this "would not mean that this Court would pass an order contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of a legislative act".

24. The position in law was reaffirmed in a subsequent decision of a Bench of three Judges in Union of India v. Dattatray, 2008(2) S.C.T. 177 : 2008(2) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 390 : (2008) 4 SCC 612. The respondent was appointed as an Assistant Professor of Psychiatry in a government hospital on the strength of a claim to belong to a Scheduled Tribe. The Scrutiny Committee in an order of March 1999 found that the claim that he belonged to the Halba Tribe was false. The High Court upheld the invalidation of the tribe claim but held that the respondent would not be entitled to any benefit as a member of the Scheduled Tribe from the date of its decision. In consequence, the services of the respondent were directed not to be disturbed. This Court held that the High Court had misconstrued the decision of the Constitution Bench in Milind (supra) and adverted to the peculiar circumstances in which protection was granted in that case to a student who had been admitted to a medical course over 15 years ago. Distinguishing that decision with the case at hand this Court observed that :

The judgment of the High Court directing the continuance of the first respondent in service was accordingly set aside.

25. In Yogesh Ramchandra Naikwadi v. The State of Maharashtra, 2008(2) S.C.T. 654 : (2008) 5 SCC 652, the direction contained in paragraph 38 of the decision of the Constitution Bench in Milind (supra) for protecting a student who had completed his medical studies, when nearly 15 years had elapsed, was held to be referable to the power conferred upon by this Court by Article 142 of the Constitution. This Court observed :

(emphasis supplied)

In the case at hand, though the Scrutiny Committee had rejected the claim of the appellant even prior to his admission to the professional degree course in engineering, the High Court had directed by an interim order the grant of provisional admission. This Court observed that since the admission to an engineering course had been obtained nearly 13 years earlier and the candidate had already secured a degree, he should be permitted to retain the benefit of the degree subject to the condition that he would not claim any further benefit as a member of a Scheduled Tribe and any expenditure incurred in terms of an exemption from the fee or a grant of scholarship, would be recovered.

The following decisions of this Court, the act of obtaining a benefit reserved for designated castes, tribes and classes by an individual who does not belong to the designated community, on the basis of a false caste claim has been held to constitute an egregious violation, even a fraud on the Constitution :

26. We may now advert to a line of precedent, upon which reliance has been placed by the private party claimants, to indicate the circumstances in which recourse has been taken by this Court to its jurisdiction under Article 142. Sandip Subhash Parate v. State of Maharashtra, 2006(4) S.C.T. 125 : (2006) 7 SCC 501, is a decision of a Bench of two Judges of this Court. The claim of the appellant to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe formed the basis of his admission to the B.E. degree course at the University of Pune. The claim was invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee. In a writ petition challenging the order of the Scrutiny Committee the appellant had the benefit of an interim order. Eventually the Writ Petition was allowed and the proceedings were remanded to the Scrutiny Committee. The Scrutiny Committee on remand rejected the claim against which another writ petition was filed. Though no interim relief was granted in the writ petition the appellant was allowed to continue with his studies and he completed engineering studies in 2004. Both the Writ Petition and the Review Petition before the High Court were dismissed. On these facts, the bench of two judges held that prima facie the case of the appellant indicated that he was under a bona fide belief that Koshti - Halbas were members of a Scheduled Tribe particularly since he had obtained admission prior to the decision in Milind (supra). Hence in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 the Bench observed that it did not find any lack of bona fides on his part. The decision then holds that :

27. In Central Warehousing Corporation v. Jagdishkumar Vithalrao Panjankar, C.A .No. 233 of 2007, decided on 16 January 2007, a Bench of two Judges of this Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 protected the services of the respondent who had worked from 1984 on the strength of a claim to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe though it was found that he was a Koshti. A similar protection has been granted in State of Maharashtra v. Om Raj, (2007) 14 SCC 488 by a Bench of two Judges where admission, or as the case may be, appointment to a service was obtained on the basis of a claim to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe though the individuals concerned were found to be Koshti. The decision dealt with a batch of cases which were held to be covered by Milind.

28. The long tenure of an employee was pressed in aid in a judgment of a Bench of two Judges of this Court in Raju Ramsing Vasave v. Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar, (2008) 9 SCC 54 as a ground for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142. In that case the first respondent was, on the strength of a Scheduled Tribe certificate of August 1987, employed in the State Pollution Control Board and his status as a member of a Scheduled Tribe was confirmed in a decision of the High Court in August 1988. The Scrutiny Committee, however, invalidated the claim of the respondent to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe. However, the High Court held that its earlier decision of August 1988 had attained finality and that the status of the first respondent could not be questioned again. This Court by its judgment held that when an advantage is obtained by a person in violation of the constitutional scheme a constitutional fraud is committed. The earlier decision of the High Court which was rendered without a factual foundation was held not to operate as res judicata. However, since the Bombay High Court had allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent in 1988 and he had continued in service since long, recourse was taken to the jurisdiction under Article 142, to protect his service albeit on the basis that he belongs to the general category. The benefit of the protection of service was again granted by a Bench of two judges in Punjab National Bank v. Vilas Govindrao Bokade, (2008) 14 SCC 545. A similar protection has been extended in Vijaykumar v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 14 SCC 489, Damodhar v. Secretary, Industrial, Energy & Labour Department, (2010) 15 SCC 537, Raiwad Manojkumar Nivruttirao v. State of Maharashtra, 2012(1) S.C.T. 390 : (2011) 9 SCC 798 and Dattu Namdev Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 1 SCC 549.

29. A decision rendered by this Court in 2012 in the case of Kavita Vasant Solunke v. State of Maharashtra, 2012(4) S.C.T. 733 : (2012) 8 SCC 430 involved a situation where the appellant applied for the post of a teacher in a high school which was reserved for a Scheduled Tribe claiming to be a Halba. She was appointed on probation in August 1995 and was confirmed in service. The proceeding before the Scrutiny Committee revealed that the appellant was a Koshti by caste and not a Halba as a result of which the caste certificate was cancelled. This led to the termination of the services of the appellant on 23 February 2008. The School Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant on 28 September 2008 and the writ petition before the High Court resulted in an order of rejection. This Court held that the Scrutiny Committee had not found that the caste certificate was false, fabricated or manipulated or that the Scrutiny Committee found any fraud, fabrication or misrepresentation. In the circumstances, this Court directed that the services of the appellant be protected but that she would not be entitled to any further benefits on the basis of the caste certificate cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee :

(emphasis supplied)

This decision of two learned judges does not indicate that the provisions of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 were noticed.

30. The issue was revisited in another decision of two judges in Shalini Gajananrao Dalal v. New English High School Association, 2014(1) S.C.T. 605 : (2013) 16 SCC 526. The appellant obtained a certificate of belonging to the Halba Scheduled Tribe in July 1974. On the strength of a claim that the Gadwal Koshti caste (to which she belonged) had consanguinity to the Halba Scheduled Tribe, she was appointed as an Assistant Teacher and was confirmed in 1984. She was promoted as a Head Mistress in 1994. The Scrutiny Committee in August 2003 held that the caste certificate obtained by the appellant was invalid. A learned Single Judge of the High Court granted protection in service on the strength of a G.R. dated 15 June 1995. Thereafter protracted litigation ensued which eventually resulted in a Single Judge of the High Court setting aside the order of reinstatement passed by the School Tribunal. This order was confirmed in appeal by a Division Bench of the High Court. Summarising the position which emerged from earlier decisions of two judges, this Court has held that :

The High Court in that case had while rejecting the claim of the appellant relied upon the decision of three Judges in Dattatray (supra). However, this Court held that the decision in Dattatray cannot be construed to have overruled earlier decisions of two Judges. In that context this Court has held that :

In the view of this Court, Section 10 of the Act cancels any benefit which may have been derived by a person on the basis of a false caste certificate. Explaining the ambit of the provision, the Court has held that :

The above extract indicates that this Court has in Shalini imported a requirement of dishonest intent, before the withdrawal of benefits mandated by Section 10 of the State legislation can take effect.

Since there was no falsity in the claim of the appellant, the Court held that Section 10 would not apply to her case. The appellant was accordingly reinstated without any back-wages subject to the condition that she would not be entitled to any further promotion as a Scheduled Tribe candidate.

31. In R. Unnikrishnan v. V. K. Mahanudevan, 2014(1) S.C.T. 748 : 2014(2) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 158 : (2014) 4 SCC 434 the respondent applied for the grant of a Scheduled Caste certificate on the basis that he was a Thandan which was a notified Scheduled Caste. The Tahsildar found that the respondent did not belong to the Scheduled Caste in question. In the course of writ proceedings, the High Court directed the Tahsildar to issue a caste certificate following which the respondent was appointed as an Assistant Executive Engineer in a Special Recruitment Drive for Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe candidates. Subsequently, following the decision of a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, the caste certificate of the respondent came under scrutiny and it was found that the respondent actually belonged to the Ezhuva community which fell in the OBC category. The respondent challenged the enquiry proceedings in a Writ Petition. The High Court quashed the enquiry. The Division Bench of the High Court in appeal directed a fresh enquiry into the caste status of the respondent. A fresh enquiry resulted in the finding that the claim of the respondent to belong to a Scheduled Caste was invalid. Following the order of the High Court the State Government held that the respondent did not belong to a Scheduled Caste but belonged to a community which was designated as an OBC and if any benefits have been obtained on a wrongful basis, they would be recovered. Both the learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court and in appeal the Division Bench held that the caste status of the respondent had already attained finality and could not be reopened. This Court observed that in Palghat Jilla Thandan Samudhaya Samrakshna Smithi v. State of Kerala, 1994(1) S.C.T. 693 : (1994) 1 SCC 359, it had held that the Thandan community being listed in the Scheduled Castes Order 1950, it was not open to the State to embark upon an enquiry whether a section of Ezhuva/Thiyya which was called Thandan in the Malabar area was excluded from the benefits of the Order. This Court noted that by an amendment of 2007 to the Constitution Scheduled Castes Order, Ezhuvas and Thiyyas in the erstwhile Cochin and Malabar areas are no longer Scheduled Castes with effect from 30 August 2007 and would no longer be entitled to be treated as a Scheduled Caste nor will the benefits of reservation be admissible. However, after adverting to the decisions in Milind, Kavita Solunke and Sandeep Parate this Court held that :

32. We may also at this stage advert to a judgment of two learned judges of this Court in B. H. Khawas v. Union of India, 2016(4) S.C.T. 200 : (2016) 8 SCC 715. In that case, the appellant was appointed as a Chemical Engineer Grade-I in the Customs and Central Excise Department in June 1995 against a vacancy reserved for a Scheduled Tribe. The letter of appointment provided that the appointment was provisional and subject to verification of the caste certificate. His services were terminated in 2004 following a decision of the Scrutiny Committee that he belonged to the Koshti which is not a Scheduled Tribe in the State of Maharashtra. The appellant submitted a representation on the receipt of the order of the Scrutiny Committee claiming that he had not furnished false information and the caste certificate was obtained by him bona fide on the basis of the school record. The appellant also claimed that the issue as to whether the Koshti caste is a part of the Halba Scheduled Tribe was the subject matter of intense debate until it was resolved on 28 November 2000 by the Constitution Bench in Milind (supra). Eventually he moved the Central Administrative Tribunal which directed that the appointment of the appellant which was made prior to the decision in Milind (supra) should be protected. When the decision of the Tribunal was assailed, the Division Bench of the High Court relied on the decision in Dattatray (supra) and restored the order of termination dated 8 June 2004. In appeal before this Court, it was urged that the decision of the Constitution Bench in Milind (supra) protected all appointments which had become final. This Court observed that in paragraph 38 of the decision of the Constitution Bench in Milind it has been made clear that "the admissions and appointments that have become final, shall remain unaffected by this judgment". The appointment of the appellant as Chemical Engineer Grade-I was, it was held, provisional and subject to the verification of his caste claim. It was not treated as being final by the department till the order of termination was issued. Since the appointment was made on a provisional basis subject to the verification of the caste certificate it was held that the appellant was not entitled to the protection of his service. Both the earlier decisions in Kavita Solunke and in Shalini were distinguished on the ground that in the former the appointment had attained finality and could not be disturbed while in the subsequent decision also, the appointment as an Assistant Teacher had attained finality and she had been confirmed in service. Similarly in Unnikrishnan the Court was held to be dealing with a matter where the caste claim was already a subject matter of challenge before the Court and had been upheld. In this background, this Court in Khawas held as follows :

Following this principle, it was held that the appellant was not entitled to any relief on the finding that his appointment as Chemical Engineer had not attained finality. Once the Scrutiny Committee held that the appellant did not belong to the Halba community the High Court was held to be justified in allowing the writ petition filed by the Department. The order of termination was hence restored.

The decision of this Court in Khawas specifically rejects the submission that the decision of the Constitution Bench in Milind would protect all appointments made before 28 November 2000 even though they were not final. If the appointment was yet to be subject to scrutiny by the Caste Scrutiny Committee it would evidently not have attained finality prior to the date of the judgment in Milind (supra).

F Decisions of the Bombay High Court

33. In Ramesh Suresh Kamble v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 1 MhLJ 423, a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Mr Justice R M Lodha (as the learned Chief Justice then was), Mr Justice S A Bobde (as the learned Judge then was) and Mr Justice S B Deshmukh considered the provisions of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001, particularly Sections 7(1) and 10(1) in the context of the electoral disqualification of a Councillor elected under the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act following the invalidation of the caste certificate. After adverting to the decision of an earlier Full Bench in Sujit Vasant Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 3 MhLJ 1109, the Full Bench held thus :

(emphasis supplied)

Again, in the view of the Full Bench :

Another Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Ganesh Rambhau Khalale v. State of Maharashtra, 2009(2) S.C.T. 418 : (2009) 2 MhLJ 788 held that the directions which were issued by the Constitution Bench of this Court in paragraph 38 of its decision in Milind were in exercise of the power conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution.

34. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Priyanka Omprakash Panwar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 4 MhLJ 847 has construed the provisions of Section 10 of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 in holding thus :

This decision has been followed in a subsequent decision in Apurva Ashok Gokhale v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 1 MhLJ 139.

35. In Arun Vishwanath Sonone v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 1 Mh L.J. 457, two questions were referred for decision to a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court :

The Full Bench has held that a caste certificate whether issued prior to or after the coming into force of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 is valid subject to verification and the grant of a validity certificate by the Scrutiny Committee. The Full Bench has taken the view that Section 10 of the State Act regarding the withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis of a false caste certificate operates with effect from 18 October 2001. Section 10, in the view of the High Court is "essentially penal in nature" and shall have no effect on the benefits secured or an appointment obtained prior to the coming into force of the enactment. Hence, the view of the High Court is that :

The Full Bench has taken the view that the observations of this Court in Shalini Gajananrao Dalal v. New English High School Association, 2014(1) S.C.T. 605 : (2013) 16 SCC 526 impliedly overruled the earlier judgments of the Full Benches of the High Court in Sujit Vasant Patil and Ganesh Rambhau Khalale (supra). In the view of the Full Bench an innocent statement made by error should not in the absence of an element of deceitfulness operate to deprive a candidate of the benefits obtained on the foundation of a false certificate. The Full Bench held, following decision of this Court in Kavita Solunke, that :

The judgment of the Full Bench also holds that the directions which were issued by the Constitution Bench in Milind are in two parts - the first being to save the admission and degree secured while the other is of a general nature invoking the doctrine of prospective overruling to save admissions and appointments that have become final. Hence, according to the Full Bench, the ratio of the earlier Full Bench judgment in Ganesh Rambhau Khalale holding that the clarificatory directions in Milind were referable to Article 142 would run contrary to the decisions in Kavita Solunke and Shalini and would cease to be a binding precedent. Consequently, the first question which was referred to the Full Bench has been answered in the affirmative by holding that the relief of the protection of services after the invalidation of a caste claim can be granted by the High Court on the basis of the decisions of this Court in Kavita Solunke and Shalini.

G Submissions

36. In the present batch of cases, the almost uniform facet is that the claim to belong to a reserved category has been rejected upon scrutiny.

37. On behalf of the persons whose caste or tribe claims have been rejected, the following submissions have been urged :

Besides the above submissions it has also been urged that in so far as Halba-Koshtis are concerned:

H PART II : Analysis

38. Having put together the body of material on the subject, including the precedents and legislation governing the area, the stage for analysis is now reached. That is what this judgment now seeks to embark upon.

39. The backdrop for the decision in Madhuri Patil (supra) was provided by the significant scale on which benefits were secured by importers by passing themselves off as members of castes, tribes and classes for whom reservations have been earmarked pursuant to constitutional provisions. By its directions which this Court issued on 2 September 1994 provision was made for the constitution of committees for verification of claims belonging to a designated caste, tribe or class. This Court explained the modalities to be followed by the Scrutiny Committees and the manner in which action would be taken if a claim was found to be false. The directions which were issued by this Court envisaged that upon a claim being found to be false or spurious :

40. The Constitution Bench of this Court which decided Milind (supra) was on a reference whether it is permissible to hold an enquiry and let in evidence to decide or declare that any tribe or tribal community or a part or group within the tribe or community is included in the general name, even though it is not so specifically mentioned in the entry contained in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. The Constitution Bench held that it was not permissible either to hold an enquiry or to allow evidence to decide that though a tribe (or its sub group) is not specifically included in the Scheduled Tribes Order, 1950 it must, nonetheless, be treated or deemed to be included in the general name. The view of this Court is that an entry in the Order has to be read as it stands. However, the Constitution Bench in paragraph 38 of its decision, having due regard to the circumstances of the individual cases before the Court, protected the degree obtained by the candidate concerned. This Court also provided that having regard to the passage of time including interim orders which were passed, the admissions and appointments that have become final would remain unaffected by the judgment. The observations in paragraph 38 of the decision of the Constitution Bench have been construed in at least the following judgments of this Court as directions referable to Article 142 of the Constitution :

41. Since the decision of the Bench of three judges in R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala (supra) the position of law which has been laid down by this Court is that where an appointment to a post or admission to an educational institution is made against a vacancy which is reserved for a Scheduled Caste or Tribe or a socially and educationally backward class, the invalidation of the claim of the candidate would result in the appointment or, as the case may be, the admission being void and non etc. This principle has been followed by another judgment of three Judges in Dattatray (supra). The same position has been propounded by a two judge bench in Bank of India v. Avinash Mandivikar (supra). The formal termination of an employment or the withdrawal of admission is a necessary consequence which flows out of the invalidation of the caste or tribe claim. The only exception to this principle consists of those cases where, in exercise of the power conferred by Article 142, the Court considered it appropriate and proper to protect the admission which was granted or, as the case may be, the appointment to the post.

42. In Kavita Solunke (supra) the appellant had been appointed on the strength of a claim to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe in August 1995. After the tribe claim was verified by the Scrutiny Committee it was found that the appellant was in fact a Koshti and not a member of the Halba Scheduled Tribe following which an order of termination was issued. The sole ground on which the termination was challenged and which was accepted by the bench of two judges was that since the appointment of the appellant had attained finality, it could not have been set aside on the ground that the appellant did not belong to a Scheduled Tribe. Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 was evidently not placed before the court in Kavita Solunke (supra) and has not been noticed. Upon the enactment of the Act, the invalidation of a caste certificate by the Scrutiny Committee would as a statutory mandate result in the withdrawal of the benefits which had accrued on the strength of the claim and where a candidate had been appointed to a reserved post, termination would follow the finding that the candidate did not belong to the category for whom the post was reserved. If the provisions of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 were to be considered by the bench of two judges, it would be apparent that under the provisions of Section 7 the Scrutiny Committee is empowered to verify a caste certificate whether issued before or after the commencement of the Act and if it comes to the conclusion that the caste certificate is false and is obtained fraudulently it is empowered to order its cancellation and confiscation. Section 10 provides for the withdrawal of benefits secured when a caste certificate is concerned for its falsity. Falsity is adjudicated upon when an order of cancellation is passed under Section 7. Once a caste certificate is cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee under Section 7, the individual affected by the order has a remedy to challenge its cancellation before the High Court under Article 226. If the challenge fails or if the challenge is given up, and the only relief sought is of the protection of service, or of the admission to the course, the grant of such protective relief simpliciter would be impermissible. The withdrawal of the benefit under Section 10 follows an order of cancellation under Section 7. Once the conditions for cancellation are fulfilled and an order of cancellation is passed under Section 7 withdrawal of all benefits which have accrued on the basis of the claim (which stands invalidated) cannot be opposed on a theory that there was an absence of dishonest intent.

43. The rationale which weighed with the Bench of two Judges which decided Kavita Solunke (supra) was that if the Halba Koshti had been treated as Halba even before the appellant had joined the service and if the only ground for ouster was the law declared in Milind (supra), there was no reason why protection against ouster to appointees whose applications had become final be not also extended to the appellant. Placing reliance on the decision in Kavita Solunke (supra) another Bench of two Judges of this Court in Shalini (supra) propounded a test of dishonest intent for the grant or denial of protection to persons whose caste claims had been invalidated. The view of the Court emerges from the following extract contained in para 9 of the decision which reads thus :

The above observations must be read together with those in paragraph 11 (extracted earlier) where the Court held that a dishonest intent requires legal retribution. In Shalini (supra) the Court noticed the provisions of Section 10 of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 (which the earlier decision in Kavita Solunke (supra) had not noticed) but nonetheless held that in order to attract the provisions of Section 10 a dishonest intent for the purpose of claiming a benefit reserved for the Scheduled Castes or Tribes or a designated backward class is necessary. The expression "false" contained in Section 10 of the Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 is construed to necessarily require the presence of mensrea or a dishonest intent.

44. The object and purpose underlying the enactment of the state legislation is to regulate the issuance of caste certificates and to deal with instances which had come to light where persons who did not belong to the Scheduled Castes or Tribes or reserved categories were seeking appointments or admissions to the detriment of genuine candidates. The basic purpose and rationale for the legislation is to secure the just entitlements of legitimate claimants. The judgment in Shalini (supra) is with respect in error in imputing the requirement of a dishonest intent into the provisions of Section 10. Sections 7 and 10 have to be construed in harmony. Section 7 provides for the cancellation of a caste certificate where before or after commencement of the Act, a person who does not belong to a reserved category has obtained a false caste certificate and the Scrutiny Committee, after enquiry, is of the opinion that the certificate was obtained fraudulently. These requirements have to be fulfilled before the certificate is cancelled. The falsity of the caste certificate and the opinion of the Scrutiny Committee of its being fraudulently obtained form the basis of a cancellation under Section 7. Section 10 prescribes that a person who does not belong to a reserved category and secures admission or obtains appointment against a reserved post by producing a false caste certificate shall upon its cancellation by the Scrutiny Committee be debarred from the institution or as the case may be discharged from employment and the benefits derived shall be withdrawn. Sub-section (2) provided for the recovery of all financial benefits while sub-section (3) provides for the cancellation of a degree, diploma or educational qualification. Sub-section (4) provides for disqualification from electoral office. The falsity of the certificate is the basis of an order under Section 7. Section 10 provides the consequence. The challenge to an order of the Scrutiny Committee (invalidating a caste or tribe certificate) may fail or succeeds. If the challenge before the High Court succeeds, no question of the consequence under Section 10 arises. If the challenge fails, the consequence under Section 10 follows the finding in the order under Section 7 that the certificate is false. Similarly, if the order under Section 7 is not challenged, or if the challenge is given up, there is no occasion to protect the benefits secured on the basis of a certificate which is invalidated. The expression "false" must be construed in contra-distinction to that which is true, genuine or authentic. Falsity in this sense means the setting up of a claim to belong to a reserved category.

45. Section 10, it must be noted, provides for the withdrawal of civil benefits which have accrued to an individual on the strength of a claim to belong to a reserved category, when the claim upon due enquiry and verification is invalidated. Section 10, as its marginal note indicates, provides for the withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis of a false caste certificate. Section 11 provides for offences and penalties. The invalidation of a caste certificate may result in two consequences : (i) immediate cancellation or withdrawal of the benefits received by the candidate on the basis of a false caste certificate; (ii) prosecution of a claimant who procures a certificate which is found to be false by the Scrutiny Committee. The intent of a candidate may be of relevance only if there is a prosecution for a criminal offence. However, where a civil consequence of withdrawing the benefits which have accrued on the basis of a false caste claim is in issue, it would be contrary to the legislative intent to import the requirement of a dishonest intent. In importing such a requirement, the bench of two Judges in Shalini (supra) has, with great respect, fallen into error. The judgment in Shalini (supra) must, therefore, be held not to lay down the correct principle. In the very nature of things it would be casting an impossible burden to delve into the mental processes of an applicant for a caste certificate. As the provisions of the Act indicate, a person, who claims to belong to a reserved category and who seeks the benefit of an appointment to a reserved post or of admission to an educational institution against a reserved seat or any other benefit provided by the provisions of Article 15(4), has to apply for the grant of a caste certificate. The burden of proof that he or she belongs to such a caste, tribe or class lies with the claimant. The legislature has legitimately assumed that a person who seeks a caste certificate must surely be aware of the caste, tribe or class to which he or she belongs and must establish the claim. If the claim to belong to the reserved category is found to be untrue, the caste certificate has to be cancelled on the ground that it has been obtained falsely. The grant of the benefit to the candidate is fraudulent because the candidate has obtained a benefit reserved exclusively for a specified caste, tribe or class to which he or she is not entitled. The decision in Shalini (supra) would result in serious consequences and would eviscerate the statutory provision. The interpretation which has been placed on the provisions of Section 10 by the judgment in Shalini (supra) is evidently incorrect.

46. Service under the Union and the States, or for that matter under the instrumentalities of the State sub serves a public purpose. These services are instruments of governance. Where the State embarks upon public employment, it is under the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 to follow the principle of equal opportunity. Affirmative action in our Constitution is part of the quest for substantive equality. Available resources and the opportunities provided in the form of public employment are in contemporary times short of demands and needs. Hence the procedure for selection, and the prescription of eligibility criteria has a significant public element in enabling the State to make a choice amongst competing claims. The selection of ineligible persons is a manifestation of a systemic failure and has a deleterious effect on good governance. Firstly, selection of a person who is not eligible allows someone who is ineligible to gain access to scarce public resources. Secondly, the rights of eligible persons are violated since a person who is not eligible for the post is selected. Thirdly, an illegality is perpetrated by bestowing benefits upon an importer undeservingly. These effects upon good governance find a similar echo when a person who does not belong to a reserved category passes of as a member of that category and obtains admission to an educational institution. Those for whom the Constitution has made special provisions are as a result ousted when an importer who does not belong to a reserved category is selected. The fraud on the constitution precisely lies in this. Such a consequence must be avoided and stringent steps be taken by the Court to ensure that unjust claims of importers are not protected in the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142. The nation cannot live on a lie. Courts play a vital institutional role in preserving the rule of law. The judicial process should not be allowed to be utilised to protect the unscrupulous and to preserve the benefits which have accrued to an importer on the specious plea of equity. Once the legislature has stepped in, by enacting Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001, the power under Article 142 should not be exercised to defeat legislative prescription. The Constitution Bench in Milind spoke on 28 November 2000. The state law has been enforced from 18 October 2001. Judicial directions must be consistent with law. Several decisions of two judge benches noticed earlier, failed to take note of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001. The directions which were issued under Article 142 were on the erroneous inarticulate premise that the area was unregulated by statute. Shalini noted the statute but misconstrued it.

47. Cooley's Treatise on Constitutional Limitations[3]places the matter succinctly in the following terms :

In a recent judgment of this Court in Anurag Kumar Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2017(1) S.C.T. 134 : (2016) 9 SCC 426, it has been held that judicial discretion can be exercised only when there are two or more possible lawful solutions. Courts cannot give a direction contrary to a statute in the purported exercise of judicial discretion. The power under Article 142 of the Constitution is one which is wielded with circumspection and not in a manner which would defeat statutory intent, purpose and language. Aharon Barak in his book titled "Judicial Discretion (1989)" states thus:

48. The Full Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Arun Sonune (supra) has essentially construed the judgments in Kavita Solunke (supra) and in Shalini (supra) as having impliedly overruled the earlier Full Bench judgments in Ganesh Rambhau Khalale and Ramesh Kamble. In view of the conclusion which we have arrived at in regard to the earlier decisions rendered by the two Judge Benches in Kavita Solunke (supra) and Shalini (supra), we are unable to subscribe to the view expressed by the Full Bench in Arun Sonone (supra). The judgment of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Arun Sonone (supra) holds that

49. We do not find any merit in the submission which has been urged on behalf of the persons whose castes/tribes claims have been invalidated that Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 cannot apply to admissions or appointments which were made prior to the date on which the Act came into force.

50. The submission based on retrospectivity overlooks certain crucial links in the analysis. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have a retrospective operation. However, the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Equally the rule against retrospective construction is not applicable to a statute merely because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing.[4]Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 provides in Section 1 (2) that it shall come into force on such dates as the State Government may, by notification in the official gazette, appoint upon receiving assent of the President. The Act was notified to come into force by a government notification dated 17 October 2001 with effect from 18 October 2001. Prior to the enforcement of the Act, the regime which held the field was in terms of the directions that were issued by this Court in its judgment dated 2 September 1994 in Madhuri Patil. The directions which were issued by this Court comprehended :

51. The regime which obtained since 2 September 1994 under the directions in Madhuri Patil was granted a statutory status by the enactment of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001. Section 7 provides for the cancellation and confiscation of a false caste certificate whether it was issued before or after the commencement of the Act. The expression "before or after the commencement of this Act" indicates that the Scrutiny Committee constituted under Section 6 is empowered to cancel a caste certificate whether it was issued prior to 18 October 2001 or thereafter. Section 10 which provides for the withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis of a false caste certificate which is withdrawn is essentially a consequence of the cancellation of the caste certificate. Where a candidate has secured admission to an educational institution on the basis that he or she belongs to a designated reserved category and it is found upon investigation that the claim to belong to that category is false, admission to the institution necessarily falls with the invalidation of the caste certificate. Admission being founded on a claim to belong to a specified caste, tribe or class, it is rendered void upon the claim being found to be untrue. The same must hold in the case of an appointment to a post. Therefore, the absence of the words "before or after the commencement of this Act" in Section 10 makes no substantive difference because a withdrawal of benefit is an event which flows naturally and as a plain consequence of the invalidation of the claim. Moreover, as we have seen even prior to the enactment of the state legislation, the benefit which was secured on the basis of a caste claim was liable to be withdrawn upon its invalidation. The Act has hence neither affected vested rights nor has it imposed new burdens. The Act does not impair existing obligations in Sections 7 and 10.

However, an analysis of the provisions of Section 11 demonstrates that the provision creates offences and provides for penalties. Under Section 11 (1) (a) the offence consists of obtaining a false caste certificate (by furnishing false information), filing a false statement or document or by any fraudulent means. Under Section 11 (1)(b) the offence consists in securing a benefit exclusively reserved for designated castes, tribes or classes by a person who does not belong to that category in terms of

52. The provisions of Section 11 (1) must be read and construed in a prospective sense having regard to the guarantee contained in Article 20(1) of the Constitution. The offence having been created by Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001, the Act which constitutes the offence must relate to a period after the date of the enforcement of the Act. In terms of the penal provisions of Section 11, the statute in so far as it creates offences and provides for penalties must hence be construed prospectively.

53. Administrative circulars and government resolutions are subservient to legislative mandate and cannot be contrary either to constitutional norms or statutory principles. Where a candidate has obtained an appointment to a post on the solemn basis that he or she belongs to a designated caste, tribe or class for whom the post is meant and it is found upon verification by the Scrutiny Committee that the claim is false, the services of such an individual cannot be protected by taking recourse to administrative circulars or resolutions. Protection of claims of a usurper is an act of deviance to the constitutional scheme as well as to statutory mandate. No government resolution or circular can override constitutional or statutory norms. The principle that government is bound by its own circulars is well-settled but it cannot apply in a situation such as present. Protecting the services of a candidate who is found not to belong to the community or tribe for whom the reservation is intended substantially encroaches upon legal rights of genuine members of the reserved communities whose just entitlements are negated by the grant of a seat to an ineligible person. In such a situation where the rights of genuine members of reserved groups or communities are liable to be affected detrimentally, government circulars or resolutions cannot operate to their detriment.

54. One of the considerations which is placed in store before the court particularly when an admission to an educational institution is sought to be cancelled upon the invalidation of a caste or tribe claim is that the student has substantially progressed in the course of studies and a cancellation of admission would result in prejudice not only to the student but to the system as well. When the student has completed the degree or diploma, a submission against its withdrawal is urged a fortiorari. In our view, the state legislature has made a statutory decision amongst competing claims, based on a public policy perspective which the court must respect. The argument that there is a loss of productive societal resources when an educational qualification is withdrawn or a student is compelled to leave the course of studies (when he or she is found not to belong to the caste or tribe on the basis of which admission to a reserved seat was obtained) cannot possibly outweigh or nullify the legislative mandate contained in Section 10 of the state legislation. When a candidate is found to have put forth a false claim of belonging to a designated caste, tribe or class for whom a benefit is reserved, it would be a negation of the rule of law to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 142 to protect that individual. Societal good lies in ensuring probity. That is the only manner in which the sanctity of the system can be preserved. The legal system cannot be seen as an avenue to support those who make untrue claims to belong to a caste or tribe or socially and educationally backward class. These benefits are provided only to designated castes, tribes or classes in accordance with the constitutional scheme and cannot be usurped by those who do not belong to them. The credibility not merely of the legal system but also of the judicial process will be eroded if such claims are protected in exercise of the constitutional power conferred by Article 142 despite the state law.

55. This aspect has been considered in a recent judgment rendered by one of us in Nidhi Kaim and Another v. State of Madhya Pradesh And Others, 2017(2) S.C.T. 150 : (2017) 4 SCC 1, wherein, speaking for a Bench of three Judges, in a case of systemic fraud in relation to medical admissions in the State of Madhya Pradesh. It was observed as follows :

Explaining the matter further, this Court held that:

We are in respectful agreement with the above principle and statement of the legal position.

56. Medical education is what middle-class parents across the length and breadth of the county aspire for their children (whether this will continue to be so in future is a moot question). There is intense competition for a limited number of under-graduate, post-graduate and super-speciality seats. This can furnish no justification for recourse to unfair means including adopting a false claim to belong to the reserved category. The fault-lines of our system, be it in education, health or law, are that its lethargy and indolence furnish incentives for the few who choose to break the rules to gain an unfair advantage. In such a situation, the court as a vital institution of democratic governance must be firm in sending out a principled message that there is no incentive other than for behaviour compliant with rules and deviance will meet severe reprimands of the law.

I Conclusion

57. For these reasons, we hold and declare that

58. We will, now in the light of the reasons indicated above, proceed to dispose of the individual cases in the following terms :

From a reading of the judgment of the High Court, it is clear that the primary consideration which weighed with it was the decision of its Full Bench in Arun Sonone. In view of the reasons contained in the body of this judgment, this basis of the impugned decision of the High Court is erroneous. The Respondent does not belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe. It is also clear that the benefits obtained by the Respondent were subject to the decision in Milind. In Milind, this Court has held that Halba-Koshti is not a Scheduled Tribe, the relevant entry in the Scheduled Tribes Order 1950 being 'Halba, Halbi'.

There shall be no order as to costs.

.